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Tyler: Tyler: Other Constituency Statutes

Other Constituency Statutes*
RichardB. Tyler"
I. INTRODUCTION
The takeover phenomenon of the 1980s resulted in a massive
"releveraging" of American industry.' In addition to the profound impact on the
companies directly involved and those that undertook drastic measures to avert
being taken over, this "releveraging" has markedly affected groups outside the
corporations involved, such as employees, suppliers, customers, and communities.2 To meet the debt-service obligations flowing from leveraged buy-outs,
* Editor's Note: This article is reprinted as it originally appeared in an earlier volume
of the MissouriLaw Review. See 59 Mo. L. REV. 373 (1994).
** Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. B.S., 1954,
U.S. Military Academy; M.Sc.E., 1960, Purdue University; J.D. 1967, University of
Minnesota School of Law.
I wish to thank David Gallego, Robert Lay, Robin Lundstrum and Helen Vanek for
their research assistance on this project, and my colleagues, William Fisch, David
Fischer, Robert Lawless, and Al Neely for their comments on an earlier draft. Any errors
that follow are solely my responsibility.
1. Clifford L. Whitehill, The American Law Institute Tentatively Approves Part VI of
its Corporate Governance Project, in NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROJECT IN MID-

PASSAGE: WHAT WILL ITMEAN To You? 113, 120-22 (1991) (hereinafter "Whitehill");
Roberta S. Karmel, Is It Time for a FederalCorporationLaw?, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 55,
62 n.34 (1991); Deborah A. DeMott, Directors' Duties in Management Buyouts and
LeveragedRecapitalizations,49 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 517 & n.4 (1988). The "releveraging"
resulted from the use of non-investment grade ('junk") bonds and other debt and debt-like
instruments to finance hostile takeovers in leveraged buy-outs ("LBOs"), as well as the
use by companies, which feared that they might be targets of hostile takeovers, of similar
devices to eliminate public shareholders in management buy-outs ("MBOs")-the "going
private" phenomenon. For a good illustration, as well as a good read, see BRIAN
BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE (1990).
To be sure, a fair amount of scholarly opinion defended the high levels of debt as
a mechanism to compel management to work harder in order to service the debt. See
Karmel, supra, at 63 n.37.
2. Whitehill, supra note 1 at 123-24; James Lyons, ConflictingInterests, FORBES,
Mar. 30, 1992, at 48; Jonathon R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital
Investments, and the Legal Treatment ofFundamentalCorporateChanges, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 173 (arguing that stakeholders are not, in fact, harmed by hostile takeovers, and that
they are capable of protecting themselves contractually). Contra, John C. Coffee,
ShareholdersVersus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. I
(1986). See also Deals and Misdeals: A Sampling ofM&A Hits and Strikeouts in the
1980s, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, March/April 1990, at 100 (a review of the results
of a decade's combinations).
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many of which were financed with high-risk, noninvestment grade ('"junk")
bonds, companies "restructured"; employees lost their jobs, 3 older facilities were
closed to the detriment of communities dependent on them,4 existing bondholders found their claims downgraded or felt their security jeopardized, 5 and
existing suppliers and customers found their relationships disrupted, if not
dismantled entirely.6 Existing federal law7 sought to provide some protection for
shareholders faced with deciding whether to tender, but nothing spoke directly
to the concerns of these other groups; their concerns remained the focus of state
law, such as statutory and common corporate law and the law of contract and
fraudulent conveyance.
Unfortunately, neither state corporation laws nor the common law rules
applicable to corporations addressed these issues. Most statutes simply said that

3. Annie B. Fisher, Employees Left Holdingthe Bag, FORTUNE, May 20, 1991, at 83;
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder
Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REv. 45, 45 & n.4 (1991). See also Stephen M.
Bainbridge, InterpretingNonshareholderConstituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 971,
1003 nn.136 & 137 (1993). Perhaps an even more threatening development has been the
extent to which acquirors have used employee pension funds to finance takeovers, and
the resulting risk to retirees, both current and future. See, e.g., Christi Harlan, LTV's
Pension Liabilities Aren't Favored,Judge Says, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1991, at A3
(reporting that a federal judge had ruled that LTV's underfunded pension plan should not
be accorded preferred status in a bankruptcy proceeding following a merger that involved
assuming a substantial amount of debt, as well as using "excess" reserves in the pension
fund). See also Daniel Keating, PensionInsurance,Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991
Wis. L. REv. 65; Jonathon M. Moses & Milo Geyelin, RJR to Pay $72.5 Million to Settle
Suit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1992, at B8 (reporting RJR's agreement to settle a class-action
suit brought by former shareholders and employee stock-option holders who charged that
the company failed to disclose takeover talks in the months preceding its LBO).
4. See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1004 & n.141; Joseph William Singer, The
Reliance Interest in Property,40 STAN. L. REv. 611, 633-63 (1988). See also Arthur S.
Hayes, CompaniesAre Findingit Harderto Move Out of Town, WALL ST. J., March 1,
1993, at B6, col. 1, mentioning, inter alia,a suit brought by the city of Ypsilanti against
General Motors to block its planned closure of the Willow Run facility after the town had
granted GM tax abatements in 1980. Although a trial court found for Ypsilanti, the
Michigan Court of Appeals reversed. See Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506
N.W.2d I (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
5. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
In fact, the LBO phenomenon resulted in a massive shift of wealth from bondholders to shareholders. See, e.g., Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13
J. CORP. L. 205, 206-09 (1988); ROBERTW. HAMILTON, CORPORATION FINANCE: CASES
& MATERIALS 408-409 (2d ed. 1989) (recounting the downgrading of RJR Nabisco, Inc.'s
outstanding bonds after its LBO).
6. Macey, supra note 2, at 173-174.
7. Williams Act, §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/2
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the business and affairs of the corporation would be managed by, or under the
direction of, a board of directors 8 without specifying how the directors were to
carry out their functions. This omission was left to common law.9 The
traditional obligations of directors, the duty of care 0 and the duty of loyalty,"
supplemented by the business judgment rule," run to the corporation and apply
to all of the actions of the directors, including their response to takeover bids.
Thus, in most jurisdictions, it was not clear that, in deciding how to respond to
a takeover proposal, a board could consider the potential impact on constituencies outside the corporation. Cheff v. Mathes 3 did permit a board to justify a
decision to buy out the interest of an unwanted shareholder because of concern
for the interests of employees and the company's customers and suppliers, but
that was a relatively unusual case. 4

8. E.g., DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.310 (1988)
("property and business"); MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 35 (1979) [hereinafter
"MBCA"]; REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT § 8.0103) (1984) [hereinafter

"RMBCA"1].
9. Some statutes, such as MBCA § 35 and RMBCA § 8.30, and statutes patterned
after them (e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (Bums 1989), based on § 8.30 ofRMBCA)
did specify directors' duties, but these specifications were generally patterned on the rules
that evolved in the cases.
10. Usually phrased as the duty to act with that degree of care that would be exercised
by a reasonable prudent person in a similar situation under similar circumstances. See,
e.g., Boulicault v. Oriel Glass Co., 223 S.W. 423,426 (Mo. 1920); MBCA § 35. ROBERT
CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4, at 123 (1986); PHILIP G. LOUIS, JR. & FRANK
C. BROWN, 25 MISSOURI PRACTICE: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 24.3 (1993).

11. The duty of loyalty essentially addresses conflict of interest situations: directors
owe their highest degree of loyalty to the corporation; .they must not place themselves,
or allow themselves to be placed, in a position in which their personal interests conflict
with that of the corporation. See generallyRamacciotti v. Joe Simpkins, Inc., 427 S.W.2d
425 (Mo. 1968); Binz v. St. Louis Hide & Tallow Co., 378 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. Ct. App.
1964); CLARK, supra note 10, § 4.1 at 141; LOUIS & BROWN, supra note 10, § 24.4.
12. The business judgment rule says that when a matter is committed to the discretion
of the board of directors, and the board, in good faith, exercises a business judgment, a
court will not examine the merits of the decision, or second-guess the board. CLARK,
supra note 10, § 3.4, at 123; LOuIS & BROWN, supra note 10, § 24.9. See generally
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Broski v. Jones, 614 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981).
13. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
14. Other cases that appear to recognize the idea that corporations have responsibilities to groups in addition to shareholders include, e.g., Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. Inc.
v. Congoleum Corp., 554 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1977); Herald Co. v. Seawall, 472 F.2d
1081 (10th Cir. 1972); Boyertown Burial Casket Co. v. Amedco, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 811
(E.D. Pa. 1976); Elco Corp. v. Microdot, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741 (D. Del. 1973);
Abramson v. Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Shlensky v. Wrigley,
237 N.E.2d 776 (II. App. Ct. 1968). See generally Macey, supra note 2, at 177-78.
Some states, like Delaware and Missouri, did elaborate on director's standards of
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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Then, in 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Smith v. Van Gorkom"5
and imposed personal liability on a board of directors that had acceded too
readily to a friendly merger proposal originally initiated by Van Gorkom, the
autocratic chief executive officer of the company being acquired. The Delaware
court refused to give the directors the benefit of the business judgment rule
because, it held, their judgment was not informed. 6 The court imposed liability
on the directors for the difference between the merger price and a "fair" price,
and remanded for a determination of that amount; although it was ultimately
settled, without an evidentiary hearing, for $23.5 million, 7 it created a certain
amount of consternation in boardrooms across the country. 8 It also allegedly
contributed to a marked increase in the premiums for director's and officer's
liability policies ("D&O policies").' 9 Managements became more interested in

behavior in their indemnification statutes. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1991); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 351.355 (Supp. 1993). These provisions specify the circumstances under which
officers and directors may be indemnified for claims brought against them as a result of
their performance as directors and officers, and so prescribe standards of behavior in a
back-handed fashion. But, essentially, these only require that the individual seeking
indemnification have acted in good faith, and in a manner he reasonably believed to be
in, or not opposed to, the best interests of the corporation, if the action is brought by a
third party. If the action is brought by or in the right of the corporation (e.g., a
shareholder's derivative action), there is the added proviso that no indemnification may
be made with regard to any claim as to which the person has been adjudged to be liable
for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duty to the corporation, unless the
court before which the action was brought determines that, notwithstanding the judgment
of liability, it is fair and reasonable to indemnify that person.
15. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
16. The board, all of whom had served on the target's board for several years and were
familiar with the company's unsuccessful efforts to find a merger partner or otherwise
extricate itself from a capital squeeze situation, had approved the proposed merger, which
was not an arn's length transaction, on the basis of a two-hour meeting during which they
heard a presentation from the CEO (who, recall, had instigated the transaction and
suggested the price), but did not see the actual documents, or attempt to verify the
adequacy of the price, "shop" the company, or take other action to give the appearance
of independent bargaining.
17. Apparently, $10 million was covered by insurance, $10 million paid by the
corporate purchaser or an affiliate, and the directors paid the rest. See LARRY D.
SODERQUIST & A.A. SOMMER JR., CORPORATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS
206 (3d ed. 1991).
18. See Laurie Baum, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK., Sept 8, 1986, at 56; Mauro,

Liability in the Boardroom, NATION'S Bus., May 1986, at 45-46. One response to this
concern, now adopted in some 40 states, was to secure legislation permitting corporations
to adopt provisions in their articles of incorporation limiting or eliminating directors'
liability. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(c) (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,

§ 102(b)(7) (1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (Bums 1989); RMBCA § 8.30(d).
That movement is beyond the scope of this Article.
19. SODERQUIST & SOMMER, supra note 17, at 207 n.20.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/2
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having a statutory basis to permit them to consider a broadened range of factors,
particularly when responding to takeover proposals, and, with a little prompting
from the Delaware Court in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & ForbesHoldings,
Inc. ,20 "other constituency" statutes came into being. Such statutes arguably
reflect a public policy of encouraging managers to consider the effects on groups
in addition to shareholders in determining whether or not a particular action is
in the best interests of the corporation. Of course, directors could only raise the
argument that they were acting in the interests of some other constituency if the
minutes of their deliberations reflected that such considerations actually were
taken during the board's discussion of the proposed action, but that should pose
no problem for boards of directors acting under the advice of experienced
counsel. 2' Further urgency was provided as disappointed shareholders began
bringing suits against directors who successfully resisted merger proposals.22
Of course, the push for antitakeover legislation was already well
23
established-the earliest ("first generation") statutes dated from the late 1960s.
When these were struck down in Edgar v. Mite Corp.,24 the proponents of this

Shortly after Van Gorkom, a director of the leading directors' liability insurer at
Lloyd's of London said, "Any buyer who thinks the cost of his insurance will only double
is a dreamer." Newport, ProtectingDirectorsSuddenly Gets Costly, FORTUNE, Mar. 18,
1985, at 61. Two years after Van Gorkom, Kom/Ferry International estimated that the
premiums for directors' liability insurance "went up more than 900 percent in just two
years." Powell, Is It Safe to Go Back in the Boardroom?,NEWSWEEK, May 4, 1987, at
45,46.
See also Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care
Standardin CorporateGovernance, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1989), reporting that, in spite of
all the attention the case received in the business community, it did not affect the market
value of Delaware corporations. They also note that D&O insurance premiums increased
more than twelvefold in the year the Van Gorkom decision was rendered, and that the
common stock of firms writing D&O insurance rose significantly. Id. at 73. The authors
suggest that insurers were able to increase premiums beyond the actuarial fair amount.
Id. at 75.
20. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
21. That is not to suggest that counsel would falsify minutes of meetings, but only to
recognize that experienced counsel, being aware of the possibilities, would ensure that
such considerations were actually raised, and reflected in the minutes of the board's
deliberations. Then, the argument can be raised that particular action was taken in
consideration of these other groups. Less experienced counsel might not take such
precautions.
22. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
23. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests,
Effects, and PoliticalCompetency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213 (1977); Mark A. Sargent,
On the Validity ofState Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 689 (1981); Diane S. Wilner & Craig A. Landy, The Tender Trap: State
TakeoverStatutes and Their Constitutionality,45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1976).
24. 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (invalidating the Illinois first generation statute). Lower
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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legislation went back to the drawing board and continued tinkering with state
laws. It was natural to think of adding consideration of other constituencies to
the arsenal of weapons being forged to resist takeovers. Apparently permission
for directors to consider other constituencies in the context of mergers and
business combinations first appeared in the articles of incorporation of Control
Data Corporation in 1978.25 For once, the interests of management began to
coincide with those of organized labor, which had become concerned at the job
losses resulting from LBOs. This coalition began to lobby state legislatures for
legislation permitting or requiring directors to take the interests of other
constituencies into account in deciding how to respond to takeover proposals. 26
Large bondholders-institutional lenders-who saw the value of their senior
bonds degraded by the insertion of large amounts of junior debt into the capital
structures of their debtor corporations also began to demand some sort of
protection, and other constituency statutes seemed like a possible avenue.

courts promptly relied on Edgarin striking similar statutes. See National City Lines, Inc.
v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (invalidating Missouri's first generation
statute).
25. See, e.g., Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L.
REV. 121, 149 (1991); A.A. Sommer, Whom Should the CorporationServe? The BerleDoddDebateRevisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 39 (1991).
26. See John C. Coffee Jr., The Futureof CorporateFederalism: State Competition
and the New Trend TowardDe FactoMinimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 770
& n.28 (1987) (concluding that in New York, labor actively supported such legislation);
Kenneth B. Davis Jr., Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the
States, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 491,493-497 (discussing Wisconsin antitakeover legislation);
Nell Minow, Shareholders,Stakeholders, and Boards ofDirectors,21 STETSON L. REV.
197, 220 (1991) (noting that the Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO
co-sponsored the 1990 amendments to Pennsylvania's other constituency statute). Minow
also notes that, by October 17, 1990, nearly one-third of Pennsylvania's publicly traded
companies had opted out of at least some provisions of the bill; indeed, she says that over
61% of the Fortune 500 companies incorporated in Pennsylvania had opted out, as had
over 56% of those included in the Standard & Poor 500. Id. See also John C. Coffee Jr.,
The Uncertain Casefor Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders, and
Bust-ups, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435, 437 & n.8. But see Roberta Romano, The Political
Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111, 134-38 (1987) (report of her study
of the adoption of antitakeover measures in Connecticut, in which she concluded that
there was no broad-based coalition of stakeholders; rather, the legislation was special
interest legislation enacted at the behest of the incumbent managers of certain powerful
corporations).
27. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); James J. Hanks Jr., Playingwith Fire: NonshareholderConstituency
Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97, 116 (1991) (noting that many other
constituencies-like creditors-may be protected by fraudulent conveyance statutes, as
well as by contract, and noting that many lenders now include in loan documents
provisions to deal with "event risks"); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the
Various Rationalesfor Making Shareholdersthe Exclusive Beneficiariesof Corporate
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/2
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Several state legislatures responded by adopting other constituency statutes,
permitting18 or requiring29 directors to consider the impact of a takeover on
groups in addition to the shareholders; some specified particular groups,3"
whereas others phrased the permission more generally. 31 Some statutes took the
approach of including such provisions in sections specifying the standards of
directors' behavior in general; 32 most are applicable to directors' obligations in
contexts other than takeovers.33 Some statutes limit this consideration to
responding to takeovers.34

FiduciaryDuties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 40 & n.35 (1991); McDaniel, supra note 25,
at 125-26.
28. See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2202(b)(5) (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35(b) (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602
(Supp. 1993); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 8/85 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 231-35-1(d),(f),(g) (Bums 1989); IOWA CODE § 491.101B (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 271B.12-210(4) (Baldwin Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G)(2) (West
Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1993); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 156B § 65 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A .251(5) (West Supp.
1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (Supp. 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347(4)
(Supp. 1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2055(1)(c) (Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN § 14A:61(2), -14(4) (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (Michie Supp. 1992);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.59(E) (Anderson 1992); OR. REV. STAT § 60.357(5) (1993); PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 1711-1712, 1715-1717, 1721 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 47-33-4 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-35-204 (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.0827 (West 1992); WYo. STAT. § 17-16-830(e) (1977).
See Appendix, 21 STETSON L. REV. 279 (1991), for the texts of the statutes existing
as of 1991.
29. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1993).
30. E.g., id.; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.083(3) (West 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347
(Supp.1993).
31. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (Supp. 1993).
32. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West 1993).

33. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 986 n. 83, reports that only Connecticut, Iowa,
Louisiana, Missouri, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee limit their nonshareholder
constituency statutes' effect to corporate acquisitions. As indicated in notes 34 & 35,
infra, the Missouri provision has been broadened to include any exercise of business
judgment.
34. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (as originally adopted in 1986) (amended 1989).
This is also the approach taken by the American Law Institute. See ALI PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 6.02(b)(2) (Proposed Final Draft, March 31, 1992).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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Missouri's approach was initially limited to the takeover context." In 1989,
however, the scope was expanded to apply to all exercises of business
judgment.36 To date, there has been no judicial interpretation of this statute or
any of the other similar statutes, and so the question remains whether these
statutes have any significance at all. More generally, how should courts treat
37
these sorts of statutes, which exist now in at least twenty-eight states?
This Article will use the Missouri experience as a point of departure to
consider what the legal effect of "other constituency" statutes might be.
Recognizing that "other constituency" statutes were adopted along with other
statutes clearly aimed at deterring unwanted takeovers, those other statutes will
also be discussed. First, the Missouri law relating to corporate governance prior
to the enactment of the package of Missouri legislation that includes the other
constituency statute will be examined, including the legislative history of these
statutes and the sources from which they seem to have been drawn. Next, this
Article will consider whether, and to what extent, the changing nature of the
corporate shareholder population should affect the interpretation of such statutes.
This will require some digression into the "nexus of contracts" approach to
corporate theory and some counter-arguments to this approach. The effect of
these statutes on different classes of corporations--"close" to public-is then
considered. The next area of inquiry treats some of the problems with these
statutes: their permissive nature and their ambiguity. A distinction may be
taken between "structural" and "operational" decisions, but both pose conflict of
interest problems for directors. This raises questions as to the applicability of
the business judgment rule and, hence, the other constituency statutes.
Following that, this Article considers which constituencies merit consideration,

35. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (1986) read:
1. In exercising its business judgment concerning any acquisition proposal,
as defined in subsection 2 of this section, the board of directors of the
corporation may consider the following factors among others:
(4) Social, legal and economic effects on employees, suppliers,
customers and others having similar relationships with the corporation, and
the communities in which the corporation conducts its businesses;
3. Nothing in this section shall require any director or corporation to
respond to any particular acquisition proposal.
36. In 1989, Subsection 3 was modified to read:
3. Nothing in this section shall require any director or corporation to
respond to any particular acquisition proposal nor preclude directors, in
exercising their business judgment in other contexts, from considering factors
such as those enumerated in subsection 1 of this section.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347.3 (Supp. 1993). However, the title to this section remains,
"Acquisition proposals, board may make recommendation."
37. See Appendix, 21 STETSON L. REV. 279 (1991).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/2
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and then looks to the various contexts-ranging from hostile takeover bids to
routine business decisions-in which these statutes might come into play.
Returning to a supposed motive for adoption of these statutes, concern
about imposing Draconian liability on boards of directors, this Article analyzes
the possible effect of these statutes on director liability. This leads into a brief
consideration of some possible rationales for imposing liability on directors,
their interaction with statutes permitting corporations to indemnify officers and
directors, and some possible alternative remedies. A consideration of the sorts
of liabilities for which indemnification might be considered, and others for
which it would not be appropriate, follows, leading to the question of how
directors' liability might be limited, if that is desired. Finally, this Article
concludes by noting that these statutes are so flawed that they should be repealed
and suggests some other approaches to realigning the system of corporate
governance.
II. PRIOR MIssouRI LAW
Historically, Missouri statutes did not specify the standards of behavior
expected of directors, at least not directly. Rather, the statute provided that the
"property and business" of the corporation were to be "controlled and managed"
by a board of directors.38 The only express liability section in the statute
imposed personal liability on directors who knowingly declared and paid a
dividend other than as provided in the dividend statutes.39
The statutory provision for indemnification of directors, 0 which was similar
to that of Delaware,4' provided some guidance for directors. With regard to suits
brought by outsiders against a person because of serving as a director, the statute
permits indemnification if the director acted in good faith and in a manner the
director reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to,. the best interests of the
corporation-essentially a "good faith, reasonable belief' standard. When an
action was brought by or on behalf of the corporation, a director could be
indemnified according to the same standard, with the added proviso that no
indemnification could be paid with respect to any claim for which the director
was adjudged liable for negligence or misconduct unless the court determined
that, in spite of the negligence or misconduct, the director was fairly and
reasonably entitled to indemnification. This adds some element of care, or at
least non-negligent behavior, to the good faith, reasonable belief standard in
those cases in which suit is brought by or on behalf of the corporation. Also, the
statute authorizes the corporation to purchase insurance on behalf of its

38. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.310 (1986).
39. Id. § 351.345 (1986).

40. Id. § 351.355 (1986).
41. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1991).
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directors; 42 in that context, the insurance carriers may impose certain standards
on directors' behavior. However, the statute also says that it is not exclusive,43
so that a director could seek to contract for greater indemnification as a
condition to accepting a directorship. Of course, a court might impose public
policy limits on the extent to which indemnification in excess of that permitted
by statute should be allowed, but it is unclear just when such limits would be
invoked."4
Thus, based on the statutes, a director knew that he could incur liability if
he knowingly declared a dividend other than as authorized by law, although that
was qualified by permitting him to rely on financial information prepared by
company officials whom he believed to be reliable. He knew that he should be
indemnified for any action brought by anyone other than the corporation or
someone suing on its behalf if he acted in good faith, and reasonably believed
that the action was in the corporation's best interests. Even in the case of actions
brought by or on behalf of the corporation, he could be indemnified if, in
addition, he was not guilty of negligence or misconduct; even if his behavior did
not meet that standard, a court might still allow indemnification. Misconduct is
fairly easy to identify, but "negligence" is a somewhat slipperier concept. There
is also considerable slack in the concept of"good faith," and "reasonable belief'
is "soft" as well.
The real specification of standards of directors' behavior was the common
law. Missouri courts tended to follow the common law of other states-initially
Illinois, more recently Delaware. Consistent with that approach, the courts
recognized duties of care and loyalty, and also recognized the business judgment
rule as a complement to the duty of care. A director was expected to perform his
functions with the degree of care that a reasonable person in a like situation
would exercise under similar circumstances: a "reasonable, prudent director"
standard.45 The Missouri application of the business judgment rule is also quite
traditional: when directors, in good faith and in the absence of fraud or selfdealing, exercise a business judgment, the courts will not examine the merits of
that decision, unless the matter on which the directors acted was not one

42. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 351.355(8).
43. Id. § 351.355(6).
44. Dicta in cases such as Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888 (3d

Cir. 1953), suggested that Delaware courts might invalidate or refuse to enforce contracts
inconsistent with the public policy reasons for allowing indemnification. But see Hibbert
v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339 (Del. 1983) (holding that a corporation may grant
indemnification rights beyond those provided by statute);-Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA

Serv., Inc., 495 N.E.2d 562 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that contractual agreement
obligating corporation to indemnify director for legal expenses was authorized under
Delaware's nonexclusion provision, absent a finding that the director had violated any
fiduciary duty owed to the corporation).
45. Boulicault v. Oriel Glass Co., 223 S.W. 423, 426 (Mo. 1920).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/2
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committed to their discretion. 6 Although the Delaware court seems to have
incorporated a standard of care into the "good faith" element,4 7 the Missouri
court has not yet done so explicitly.48 The duty of loyalty runs to the corporation, and requires that the director avoid placing himself, or allowing himself to
be placed, in a situation in which his personal interest conflicts with that of the
corporation, Le., he must avoid conflicts of interest.49 This is tempered,
however, by the adoption, in 1983, of Missouri Revised Statute section 351.327
which, like section 144 of the Delaware Corporation Law, permits contracts
between the corporation and interested officers or directors under specified
circumstances."
The difficulty in fleshing out these standards results from the relative
paucity of cases decided in Missouri. Courts have been forced to look to
decisions in other jurisdictions to resolve issues; not surprisingly, they have
tended to look to Delaware, because of its comparatively rich body of case law.
However, the decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom,5' as well as others dealing with
directors' responses to hostile takeover bids,5" created concerns for corporate
counsel. For example, the business judgment rule presumably applied to all
aspects of directors' actions, including the response to takeover bids, at least
insofar as the matter involves only the level of care required. 3 Nevertheless, the

46. That is, if the matter was reserved for shareholder approval, a board's efforts to
take action would be ineffective. Although there are no Missouri cases directly on point,
two Delaware cases are illustrative. See Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401,
406 (Del. 1985); Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza Sec. Co., 496 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 1985).
Moreover, the courts will conduct an antecedent inquiry into the directors' good faith and
will determine whether fraud or self-dealing are present before conferring the protection
of the business judgment rule. Broski v. Jones, 614 S.W.2d 300, 304 (Mo. Ct. App.

1981).
47. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del, 1985).
48. Louis & BROWN, supra note 10, § 24.3, at 536, notes the idea of due care

involves some element of prudence, at least when the corporation in question is a
financial institution. See State ex rel. Moore v. State Bank, 561 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Mo.

Ct. App. 1978).
49. See Chemical Dynamics, Inc. v. Newfeld, 728 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987); Binz v. St. Louis Hide & Tallow Co., 378 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
50. The transaction will be sustained if it is approved, after full disclosure of the
details of the transaction and the conflict, by a majority of the disinterested directors
(even though it be less than a quorum of the board), or by a majority of the shareholders,
or if the court deems the transaction fair to the corporation as of the time it was approved.
See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 144 (1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 357.327 (Supp. 1993).

51. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
52. E.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988);
Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
53. E.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). Of course,

because tender offers raise serious conflict of interest issues for directors, courts are
justified-required-in scrutinizing closely the directors' conduct to ensure that their
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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extent to which a director's business judgment could consider the effect of a
particular action on constituencies other than shareholders was not clear,
although there had been suggestions in some cases that such considerations were
appropriate, as being in the long-term interests of the corporation. 4 Even then,
however, the courts had given only limited consideration to the weight directors
could accord to impacts on other constituencies. At least one influential court
had said that consideration of other constituencies was permissible, so long as
it did not detract from primary consideration of the interests of shareholders."
These uncertainties lead to a search for legislation that might be more
supportive of management, or at least provide the bases to argue that management's actions were proper.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Missouri has a long history of attempting to erect statutory takeover defense56
measures. The "first generation," the Missouri Takeover Bid Disclosure Act,
was held invalid under the Commerce Clause 57 following the Supreme Court's
decision in Edgarv. Mite Corp.58 The statute was amended in 198659 in an effort
to eliminate the unconstitutional features, and has not been relitigated.
Meanwhile, in 1984, Senator Webster, then Majority Leader of the Missouri
Senate, introduced Senate Bill 409, which amended several sections of the
Business Corporation Act and added the Control Share Acquisition provision,"
which provides that, unless a corporation "opts out" by a provision in its articles
of incorporation, any acquisition of "control shares'6 must be preauthorized by
action is not tainted by their self-interest, which would invoke the duty of loyalty and,
hence, rule out the application of the business judgment rule.
54. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989);
Steven M.H.Wallman, The ProperInterpretationof CorporateConstituencyStatutes and
FormulationofDirectorDuties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163, 168-170 (1991).
55. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
56. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 409.500 - .566 (1978), adopted in 1978 Mo. Laws, S.B. 820.

This was an addition to the Missouri Securities Act, and appears to have been patterned
on the Illinois statutory scheme.
57. National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982).
58. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
59. Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.500 - .566 (1986).
60. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.407 (1986) (amended 1989).
61. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.015.(5) (Supp. 1993) provides:
"Control shares" means shares that, except for this chapter, would have
voting power with respect to shares of an issuing public corporation that,
when added to all other shares of the issuing public corporation owned by a
person or in respect to which that person may exercise or direct the exercise
of voting power, would entitle that person, immediately after acquisition of
the shares, directly or indirectly, alone or as a part of a group, to exercise or
direct the exercise of the voting power of the issuing public corporation in the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/2
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a vote of the shareholders of the target corporation or the control shares will
have no voting rights. The bill specified procedures for obtaining the approval
of the shareholders and gave dissenting shareholders appraisal rights. The bill
was duly passed and signed by the governor. 2
Then, in 1986, Senator Webster introduced Senate Bill 565.63 As
introduced, the bill was limited to amending the section of the Business
Corporation Act relating to election and removal of directors.6 4 Senate Bill 565

election of directors within any of the following ranges of voting power:
(a) One-fifth or more but less than one-third of all voting power;
(b) One-third or more but less than a majority of all voting power;
(c) A majority or more of all voting power; ....
Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.015(4) (Supp. 1993) provides that "Control share acquisition"
means the acquisition, directly or indirectly by any person of ownership of,or the power
to direct the exercise of voting power with respect to, issued and outstanding control
shares ......
Finally, Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.015(10) (Supp. 1993) defines "Issuing public
corporation" to mean
[A] corporation incorporated under the laws of Missouri ...that has: (a) One
hundred or more shareholders; (b) Its principal place of business, its principal
office, or substantial assets within Missouri; and (c) One of the following: [a]
More than 10% of its shareholders resident in Missouri; [b] More than 10%
of its shares owned by Missouri residents; or [c] 10,000 shareholders resident
in Missouri....
62. The effective date for the bill was June 13, 1984. In 1985, House Bill 117
attempted to extend § 351.407 to foreign corporations with substantial Missouri
connections. The language was drawn so that only TWA qualified. That effort was held
unconstitutional in Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985), insofar as it
applied to corporations not incorporated in Missouri. The case does not speak to the
validity of § 351.407 as applied to Missouri corporations, but its validity is subject to
challenge on the same basis as the federal court invalidated a voting-type "poison pill"
in Asarco, Inc. v. A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985) (applying New Jersey law)--it
creates different voting rights among shares of the same class or series. See also Ministar
Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) and Amalgamated
Sugar Co. v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
63. JOURNAL OF THE MISSOURI SENATE, 83rd Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess., 28 (1986).
64. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.315 (Supp. 1993). The amendment was to change
subdivision 2 of that section, relating to removal of directors, to read:
Unless otherwise specified in the articlesof incorporation,[t]he entire
board of directors may be removed, with or without cause, by a vote of the
holders of a majority of the shares then entitled to vote at an election of
directors. [emphasis added.]
This would permit a corporation to provide, in its articles, that the board could be
removed only for cause; it was thus part of the package of antitakeover reforms, because
this would make it more difficult for successful bidders for control of the corporation to
install directors of their own choosing immediately, and thus would serve as a deterrent
to any attempt to acquire control of the corporation.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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was referred to the Committee on Miscellaneous Bills, of which Senator Webster
was a.member.65 After a hearing, that Committee reported the bill to the Senate,
recommending that the bill "do pass". 66 At this time, the bill apparently still
related only to the election and removal of directors.
Senator Webster next moved that Senate Bill 565, with Senate Substitute,
be called from the Informal Calendar and again taken up for perfection. 67 The
Senate Substitute significantly broadened the scope of Senate Bill 565 by adding
a number of defenses against takeovers: it increased the types of stock that
could be issued, 68 eliminated the statutory right of the holders of a given
percentage of voting stock to call special meetings of the shareholders, 69
implicitly permitted the articles to provide for shares having multiple or
fractional voting rights,70 amended the provision on indemnification to include
service on the board of an employment benefit plan,7 added a provision on stock
options and warrants,72 and added the "other constituency" statute.73 The
fragmentary legislative history available in Missouri does not reveal the source
of the Senate Substitute for Senate Bill 565; it apparently did not originate in the
Committee on Miscellaneous Bills, for then it would have been designated as

65. JOURNAL OF THE MISSOURI SENATE, supra note 64, at 97; OFFICIAL MANUAL,
STATE OF MISSOURI 105 (1985-86).
66. JOURNAL OF THE MISSOURI SENATE, supra note 64, at 296.
67. Id. at 386.
68. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.180 (1986) was amended to make it possible to authorize

"poison pill preferred" and other kinds of stock that had been developed to aid in fending

off unwanted takeover bids.
69. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.225 (1978). As amended, the section now provides

that special meetings can be called by such persons as are specified in the articles of
incorporation; formerly, the holders of one-fifth or more of the outstanding shares had the
right to call a special meeting. This change makes it more difficult for a successful
hostile takeover bidder to call a special meeting in order to replace the existing board of
directors with directors of his own choosing; it thus operates to deter takeover efforts.

See id. § 351.225 (1986).
70. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 351.180, .245.1 (1986). This would permit a corporation to
authorize a class of preferred stock and give the board of directors the power to prescribe
the relative rights of that class. Under that grant of authority, the board could create a
class of preferred stock having multiple voting rights sufficient to outvote the outstanding

common stock and place that class of preferred stock in friendly hands-like an employee
benefit plan the trustees of which are members of or chosen by management. If
sustained, such a class of stock would render a takeover impossible.
71. MO.'REv. STAT. § 351.355 (1986).
72. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.182 (1986).
73. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (1986). As initially adopted, § 351.347 related only
to the board's exercise of its business judgment in the context of responding to acquisition
proposals. See the title and the introductory language of the section:
"Acquisition proposals, board may make recommendation.1. In exercising its business judgment concerning any acquisition proposal ......
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/2
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"Committee Substitute."

After the Substitute was adopted, perfected and

printed, and passed, it moved rapidly through the House, and was signed by the
Governor on May 6th. 74
The Business Combination Act 75 was also adopted in 1986. This Act
restricts combinations between certain Missouri corporations 76 and "interested
shareholders,0 7 for a period of five years following the acquisition of the shares
making one an interested shareholder unless the board of directors of the
Missouri corporation approved the acquisition of the shares before the interested
shareholder acquired them. It thus would preclude a hostile takeover from being
completed for a period of five years following the date upon which the would-be
acquirer obtains twenty percent of the shares.78
Finally, in 1989, Senator Webster sponsored Senate Bill 141, which
modified several sections of the Corporation Act. As it emerged from the
Conference Committee and finally passed, it eliminated mandatory cumulative
voting for the election of directors, as mandated by the voters' amendment of
Section 6 of Article XI of the Missouri Constitution, amended sections 351.407
and 351.459 (the Control Share Acquisition and Business Combination
sections), and broadened section 351.347 to provide that the board could
consider other constituencies in any exercise of its business judgment.79
About all that can be inferred from this limited sketch of legislative history
is that the adoption of the "other constituency" statute was part of the antitakeover "package" the legislature was putting in place. Indeed, the very
heading of section 351.347-"Acquisition proposals, board may make
recommendation"--affirms that conclusion. It also appears, in view of the haste
with which the legislation was adopted and the circuitous route by which the
"other constituency" provision was added, that there was no material discussion
of that provision in either the legislative committee to which it was referred or
on either floor of the legislature. Significantly, none of these bills was proposed
74. Status Report, June 27, 1986, p. 2.
75. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.459 (1986).
76. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.459.1(13) (1986) defines "resident domestic corporation"
as a corporation organized in Missouri with 100 or more shareholders, its principal place
of business, principal office, or substantial assets in Missouri, and one of the following:
more than 10% of its shareholders resident in Missouri; more than 10% of its shares
owned by Missouri residents; or, 10,000 shareholders resident in Missouri. Mo. REv.
STAT. § 351.459.4 (1986) then excludes corporations not subject to § 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 unless the articles otherwise provide.
77. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.459.1(10)(a) & (b) (1986) defines "interested shareholder"
as someone who acquires 20% or more of the outstanding shares of a resident domestic
corporation.
78. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.459.2 (Supp. 1993).

79. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347.3 (Supp. 1993): "Nothing in this section shall require
any director or corporation to respond to any particular acquisition proposal norpreclude
directors, in exercising their business judgment in other contexts, from considering
factorssuch as those enumeratedin subsection I of this section." [emphasis added].
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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by the Missouri Bar Association Committee on Corporation, Banking and
Business Laws. Indeed, The Missouri Bar declined to take a position on Senate
Bill 565, on the ground that it was "not within the scope" of the Bar's legislative
activities.8 0 Interestingly, the Bar members who made this recommendation to
the governing board were not active members of the Missouri Bar Committee
on Corporation, Banking and Business Law (as the Business Law Committee
was known at the time), although that Committee had several subcommittees
active in drafting possible legislation at that time, some of whom also served as
legislative review consultants for The Missouri Bar. It is unclear who
determined to refer the proposed legislation to those particular individuals. To
be sure, the Missouri Bar-like other bar associations-is subject to many of the
same sorts of public-choice pressures as is the legislature. It seems curious,
then, that the proponents of this legislation chose to circumvent the usual routine
for Bar-sponsored legislation; it tends to reinforce the suspicion that this is,
indeed, special interest legislation, intended to foster the interests of management at the expense of the shareholders.
IV. SOURCES OF THE LEGISLATION
Missouri's Control Share Acquisition Act' and Business Combination
Act,8 2 in their present formats, both appear to have been drawn on their Indiana

counterparts.8 3 That is, the language of both statutes is almost identical. As the
brief legislative history indicates,84 however, the origins of the "other constituency" provisions are less clear. Commentators have pointed out that other
constituency provisions originated in the articles of incorporation of companies
concerned about being targets for takeover attempts.8 ' And, it has been noted, 6
that in at least seventeen states, antitakeover legislation was adopted at the

80. Telephone conversations with the Legislative Liaison of The Missouri Bar
(October 26 and 29, 1991) (memorandum of conversation on file with author). When
pressed, the Liaison indicated that there was strong feeling among some members of the
Bar that the organization should only take positions on legislation relating to the
administration ofjustice and the courts.
81. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.407 (Supp. 1993).
82. Id. § 351.459 (Supp. 1993).
83. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-5 to -9 (Bums 1989) and IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-

43-1 to -24 (Bums 1989), respectively.
84. See supra notes 56-79 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective,
46 Bus. LAW. 1355, 1356 (1991); Sommer, supra note 25, at 39.
86. Jonathon R. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the NationalEconomy,
1988 Wis. L. REV. 467, 469-70; Kenneth B. Davis, Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile
Takeover and the Role of the States, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 491, 492 n.4 (enumerating 17
states in which this occurred); Romano, supra note 26, at 122-34 (focusing on the
Connecticut statute).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/2
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behest of a single company with important local connections. There is scant
direct evidence of such involvement in Missouri with respect to most of the antitakeover legislation, although it is fairly clear that the 1985 attempt to broaden
the Missouri Control Share Acquisition Act to include foreign corporations was
pushed, and expedited through the legislature, on behalf of a single company.87
Based on these circumstances, and the somewhat circuitous way in which these
bills--especially the other constituency provision-were adopted,88 it seems
more probable than not that the legislation emanated from pro-management
sources.
Many of the proponents of constituency statutes8 9 are involved with the
Business Roundtable, or otherwise represent large public corporations. 90 But,

87. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. At least, the language of the
amendment included only one corporation: TWA, which was then the target of a
takeover bid from Carl Icahn. House Bill 117 extended the coverage of Missouri's
Control Share Acquisition Act, Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.575.2 (Supp. 1985) to "those
foreign corporations that are common carriers that have benefitted from physical facilities
financed by Missouri political subdivisions and that have over 7,500 employees in
Missouri." Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1406 (W.D. Mo. 1985). Counsel for
defendants conceded that TWA was the only corporation known to meet those
requirements. Id. at 1406 n.2.
The court sketched the approval of House Bill 117 as follows:
House Bill No. 117 (original H.B. No. 117) was prefiled on December
3, 1984. Original H.B. No. 117 was passed by the Missouri House on April
25, 1985. On May 6, 1985, original H.B. No. 117 was referred to the Senate
Commerce Committee.
Beginning on May 29, 1985, legislative action on original H.B. No. 117
accelerated. On that day, original H.B. No. 117 emerged from the Senate
Commerce Committee as Senate Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 117
(H.B. No. 117). The bill had gone from 35 words in the original H.B. No. 117
to over 1,600 words in H.B. No. 117. Later that day, the rules were suspended
and H.B. No. 117 was read for the third time and passed by the Senate.
The next day, May 30, 1985, the Senate and House appointed a
conference committee. After the conference committee reported later that
day, the House and the Senate passed H.B. No. 117. Still later that day, the
President Pro Tem of the Senate, the Speaker of the House and the Governor
signed H.B. No. 117 and it became effective immediately.
Id. at 1405-06 (footnote omitted).
88. See supra notes 56-80 and accompanying text (legislative history sketch).
89. E.g., Charles Hansen, author of the article cited in note 85, supra, represented the
Roundtable at the deliberations on the ALI Corporate Government Project.
90. E.g., Steven Wallman, whose article is cited supra note 54, is a partner in the
Washington, D.C. office of the firm of Covington & Burling. Mr. Wallman was codrafter of the first constituency statute enacted in Pennsylvania in 1983, and of the 1990
amendments to that statute.
The Business Roundtable, of course, consists primarily of attorneys who are "in
house" counsel of public corporations. Minow, supra note 26, at 221-24. The
Roundtable has shifted from a position of fostering accountability to shareholders to one
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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as Professors Klein and Coffee have pointed out,9' virtually everything
accomplished by the states' other constituency statutes could be done by
amendment of the articles of incorporation. And, as noted earlier,92 the first
other constituency provisions originated in that fashion. Why, then, did the
advocates of these provisions seek to include such provisions in the statutes-especially when one of the proponents suggested that the typical statute
would have little or no effect on the decisions courts would reach?93
One possible explanation for this preference for statutory enactment rather
than appropriate provisions in the articles of incorporation is that, for existing
corporations, such provisions would have to be incorporated by an amendment
to the articles, which would require a shareholder vote. However, if a statute is
adopted that applies to all corporations except those that provide in their articles
that the statutory limitation shall not apply to them, the shareholder vote can be
avoided.94 This has become more critical for corporate counsel because
institutional shareholders, who must focus on large public corporations, are
beginning to vote against management proposals-such as "staggered" boards
and "poison pills"-that are seen as defensive devices. 95 Perhaps "opt-in"
provisions are preferable because they permit the shareholders to decide whether
96
they want to have "their" corporation include such a limitation on liability.

of Chief Executive Officer monarchy, Minow notes. Id. at 203. The Delaware courts also
have retreated from some of their more pro-shareholder accountability holdings, like
Sinith v. Van Gorkoi, after influential corporate lawyers suggested that corporations

should consider incorporating elsewhere.
91.

WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 194 (5th ed. 1993).

92. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
93. See Hansen, supra note 85, at 1375. Hansen concluded that these statutes should

be considered primarily as a codification of the common law for jurisdictions that had not
developed case law precedent without such a statute. See id.
94. That is, the statute would be an "opt-out" type, like present MO. REV.

STAT.

§ 351.407 (Supp. 1993). An "opt-out" provision would apply a limitation to all
corporations incorporated in Missouri except those that provided in the articles of
incorporation that the statutory limitation should not apply to them. In contrast, an "optin"provision would permit corporations, by making appropriate provisions in their
articles of incorporation, to limit or eliminate the liability of directors for actions taken
in their capacities as directors except for situations involving a breach of the duty of
loyalty or other fraudulent acts.
95. See Ralph C. Ferrara & Harry Zirlin, The InstitutionalInvestor and Corporate
Ownership, 19 SEC. REG. L.J. 341, 356, 358 (1992); Karmel, supra note 1, at 83.

96. Of course, as Professor Robert Lawless has noted in conversations with the

author, to require an amendment to the Articles of Incorporation in effect turns the other

constituency statutes on their heads, in that it permits one constituency-the shareholders-to determine whether or not other constituencies should have a place at the table.
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The traditional view has been that directors are to exercise their business
judgment to the end of maximizing shareholder wealth.97 Indeed, their
obligations run primarily to the holders of common stock98 who hold the residual
interests in the corporation." Because they are the residual claimants, they bear

the highest degree of risk, and therefore have the most control (at least in
theory). Shareholders elect boards of directors to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation; over time, boards of directors have adopted various
approaches to executive compensation-such as stock options and deferred
compensation partly in an attempt to align the interests of managers more closely
to those of the common stockholders." 0 The view that boards should look
primarily to the interests of common stockholders still underlies many judicial
opinions considering the responses of boards of directors to acquisition
proposals.''
It is also implicit in many of the criticisms of the recent takeover
02
wave. 1

However, many modem developments have tended to undercut this
traditional view of the shareholders as the residual beneficiaries of the directors'
management. The rise of special classes of stock-such as "poison pill
preferred," super-voting stock, and "blank check" preferred-has attenuated the
common shareholders' already limited role in management, because those classes
are designed so that the holders can block acquisition proposals that are favored
by most of the common shareholders.'0 3 Developments in "financial engineer-

97. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) ("A business corporation
is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of
the directors are to be employed for that end."); ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, § 2.01(a) (Proposed Final Draft, March 31, 1992). Bainbridge, supranote
3, at 976-79, cites Dodge as a case rejecting board consideration of nonshareholder
constituencies in an "operational" decision, but applying the business judgment rule to
sustain most of what Henry Ford wanted to do-construct an expanded manufacturing
facility. Bainbridge is consistent with others who quote the famous passage from Dodge

to the effect that maximization of shareholder profit is the standard by which to measure
directorial performance. All of us, however, tend to overlook the fact-not clearly
articulated in the opinion-that Dodge also involved a variant of a freeze-out of the

Dodge brothers by Henry Ford, the majority shareholder. The case is thus a precursor of
cases like Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
98. KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 91, at 119-20, 126-28.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 172.
101. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc., v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173

(Del. 1986).
102. Whitehill, supra note 1, at 113; Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 973.

103. Obviously, if such special classes are created by amendment of the company's
articles of incorporation, such amendment will have to be approved by shareholders.
Such amendments will be instigated by management, however, and in most cases can be
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ing" have produced new financial products that "strip out" the claim on earnings
from the claim on assets at liquidation, further diluting the classic concept of the
roles of directors and shareholders."° Finally, the increase in institutional
shareholdings in major corporationslos marks a shift from individual investors,
who may need more judicial protection against managerial overreaching, to
sophisticated institutional investors who could, if they chose, protect themselves

approved by a mere majority of the outstanding voting shares. Cf Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 351.090 (Supp. 1993). The common shareholders, as a widely dispersed group, are in
a poor position to organize to resist a proposal that is more in management's interest than
in that of the shareholders, if they even recognize what is happening. Shareholders also
suffer from "free rider" problems and "rational apathy." That is, it may be too expensive
for an individual shareholder to inform himself adequately on a matter submitted for
shareholder approval; small shareholders may choose to rely on the efforts of larger
shareholders-institutions-to perform the research and vote appropriately. These
shareholders are "free riders" on their efforts. For the same reasons, it is rational for them
to be apathetic about matters presented to the shareholders: their holdings are too small
to have any effect, anyway. Further, the statute permits the articles to give the directors
the power to set the terms of preferred stock. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.180(1) (1986). This
power has often been used to create "poison pill preferred."
104. For example, beginning in 1983, the Americus Shareowner Service Corporation
(ASSC) has sponsored unit investment trusts, the Americus Trusts, for shares of selected
firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange. These
trusts provide investors with two new kinds of securities, known by their acronyms
"Prime" (for Prescribed Right to Income and Maximum Equity) and "Score" (for Special
Claim on Residual Equity). The owner of a share of IBM stock, for example, can deposit
his share with ASSC, receiving in exchange one Prime and one Score. Then, the
shareholder who is interested in current income can retain the Prime and sell the Score
to an investor who is willing to speculate on a potentially high return at some time in the
indefinite future. Thus, the introduction of Primes and Scores broadens investors'
portfolio choices. Clearly, however, the investor is different from the ordinary holder of
common stock. Although the holder of the Prime retains the right to direct the voting of
the underlying stock, she has given up the residual claim on assets beyond the specified
maximum. See S. Deshpande & V. Jog, Primes and Scores: What They Are and How
They Perform, in THE INVESTMENTS READER 260 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 1991).
See generally CLIFFORD W. SMITH JR. & CHARLES W. SMITHSON, THE HANDBOOK
OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING (1990); Henry T.C. Hu, New FinancialProducts, the

Modern Process ofFinancialInnovation, and the Puzzle ofShareholderWelfare, 69 TEX.
L. REV. 1274 (1991).
105. Whitehill, supra note 1, at 119. In 1989, the average ownership of institutions
of the equity of the top 100 corporations was 53.2%, and of the top 50 corporations was
50%. Id. Whitehall also states that it has been estimated that all institutional investors
currently hold in excess of 45% of total equities in the United States. Id. He attributes
the recent increase in takeovers, in part, to the increase in institutional shareholdings, with
their short-term investment horizon. Id. (citing Brancato, The Pivotal Role of
InstitutionalInvestors, in CAPITAL MARKETS: A SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH AT
THE COLUMBIA INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS PROJECT22 (1990)); Karmel, supra note 1, at

68-69.
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through appropriate provisions in articles of incorporation, contractual
provisions such as control puts,'16 by voting in corporate elections, or through
a combination of these methods. 0 7 To what extent, if at all, should these
changes in the nature of shareholders affect the interpretation of other constituency statutes? Before attempting to answer that, it is necessary to address some
other emerging issues.
Some commentators 8 describe the corporation not as an entity, but as a
"nexus of contracts." That is, the organization is viewed as a group of
identifiable participants: investors, lenders, customers, suppliers, employees and
managers. These participants negotiate an equilibrium position among
themselves."
One implication from this view is that no single group of
participants (e.g., the shareholders) has a natural right to view themselves as the
owners of the firm. Thus, shareholders are not seen as "owners," but as
suppliers-"renters"--of equity capital: they are the "residual claimants" who
have special abilities to bear risk, which creditors, managers, and employees
tend not to have. If we regard shareholders merely as residual claimants who
have agreed to accept an uncertain future return because of their superior ability
to bear risk, there is less basis to decide that they are entitled to control the firm.
Perhaps other groups-managers or creditors-should share in control. Indeed,
in many ways, these "other constituencies" are more directly affected than the

106. A "control put" is a contractual undertaking by the issuing corporation to
repurchase the shares at a stipulated price in the event of a shift in control. Such
undertakings have begun to appear in bond debentures and loan agreements. See Macey,
supra note 27, at 39 n.31 & accompanying text; John C. Coffee Jr., Unstable Coalitions:

CorporateGovernanceas a Multi-PlayerGame, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1519-20 (1990).
107. See Robert Pozen, How Fidelity Votes, FIDELITY Focus, Fall 1993, at 24, noting
that, in its role as an investment manager, Fidelity Management & Research Co.
determines how to vote the funds' holdings in corporate elections, following guidelines
established by the independent trustees of the Fidelity funds.
Of course, there are practical and legal problems inhibiting institutions' exercise of
voting power. See, e.g., Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117, 152-163 (1988); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder
Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990). For a different approach to
resolving some of these issues, see George W. Dent Jr., Toward Unijying Ownership and
Controlin the Public Corporation,1989 Wis. L. REv. 881.
108. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. & ECON. 305 (1976);
Symposium on the DistributionofPowerAmong CorporateManagers,Shareholdersand
Directors,20 J. FIN. & ECON. 3 (1988). See also Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and
the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); William A. Klein, The Modern
Business Organization:BargainingUnderConstraints,91 YALE L.J. 1521 (1982); Lewis
A. Komhauser, The Nexus of ContractsApproach to Corporations: A Comment on
Easterbrookand Fischel,89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449 (1989).
109. This perspective is well set-out in JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 28-30 (3d ed. 1989).
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shareholders: a shareholder who is properly diversified is not affected by any
particular takeover, because diversification eliminates the firm-specific risk of
the investment, but other constituencies-managers and employees-contribute
"human capital"-skills peculiar to the particular firm and not readily
transportable-that is necessarily firm-specific."' In addition, many executive
compensation devices (e.g., stock options) that are intended to align managers'
interests more closely with those of shareholders have the ancillary effect of
concentrating much of a manager's financial capital in the stock of the single
firm by which she is employed."'
There is, however, an economic argument that voting rights should vest
primarily in the residual claimants.'" 2 The residual claimants are uniquely
interested in the firm's overall profitability, but incur high "agency costs" in
attempting to monitor managers.']3 Creditors, managers, and employees are
essentially fixed claimants, who are satisfied if their claims are repaid; they will
tend to resist risky activities." 4 Because they have less interest in the overall
performance of the firm, creditors and other fixed claimants can bargain for
contractual protections and do not need representation on the board to monitor
the firm's performance. "5 Only the residual owners lack the ability, at least in

110. Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human CapitalEra: Reconceptualizing Corporate
Law to FacilitateLabor-ManagementCooperation,78 CORNELL L. REv. 901, 905-917
(1993), Coffee, supra note 2, at 17.
There is also a generational issue: to which shareholders do directors owe their
obligations, current shareholders or those who will be shareholders in the future? Also,
note the potential divergences between the interests of long-term and those of short-term
shareholders, many of whom may be arbitragers who have taken a substantial position
in the stock of a company rumored to be a potential takeover target. These short-term
shareholders are most interested in the premium over market price offered by the wouldbe acquiror, while long-term investors may have very different interests. See, e.g.,
Sommer, supra note 25, at 50.
111. Coffee, supra, note 2, at 18. See infra text accompanying notes 175-80.
112. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in CorporateLaw, 26 J.L.
& ECON.395 (1983).
113. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 108, at 308-09.
114. As Klein & Coffee point out, there is an inherent conflict of interest between the
holders of fixed claims and the residual owners, which extends into operational decisions
such as investment strategies. The holders of fixed claims, in order to ensure that their
claims will be paid, will tend to favor "safe" investments, so long as they will generate
sufficient cash flow to pay their fixed claims. A higher degree of risk benefits the
residual claimants, who will tend to favor more risky ventures. KLEIN & COFFEE, supra
note 91, at 226.
115. This, of course, is the reason for the protective covenants in bond indentures.
Id. at 258. Managers may be able to secure "golden parachutes" in their employment
contracts; in addition, top management is generally able to strongly influence the
selection of directors. See MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971);
Myles L. Mace, The Presidentand the BoardofDirectors,50 HARv. Bus. REv. 37, 37-49
(Mar.-Apr. 1972). The recent difficulties at IBM and some other large corporations have
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/2
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large corporations, to protect themselves contractually, and therefore need the
protections of the statute and of the fiduciary obligations of officers and
directors. Many of the managerial compensation plans in vogue today are
designed to reduce the shareholders' agency costs by aligning managers' interests
more closely to those of shareholders. Here, the other constituency statutes, by
enabling managers to look after their own interests rather than those of the
shareholders, work directly against these carefully-wrought schemes.
Expanding the range of constituents that the board may consider essentially
eliminates any standard by which to evaluate director performance." 6 As will
be discussed," 7 these statutes are riddled with ambiguities and questions. At
least the old common law standards gave something to gauge a director's actions.
The Revlon court said' 8 that the directors owe their obligations to the corporation, which the court apparently equated to the interests of long-term shareholders. The court did say that the board could consider the impact on other
constituencies, but that consideration had to be related to the interests of the
shareholders. "'
The "financial engineering" referred to previously' 20 has been done
externally, to a great extent, by creative investment bankers seeking to appeal
to investors' differing appetites. Some of the hybrid securities used in leveraged
buy-outs'.' and as takeover defenses2 also reflect financial engineering notions,

led to greater activism by institutional shareholders, who have forced changes at the top.
See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text. Unionized employees can seek plant
closing provisions in their contracts, although that is more difficult. Recently,
communities have begun to exact commitments from corporations in exchange for tax
abatements. See Hayes, supra note 4, at 136, noting commitments Arlington, Texas got
from General Motors in exchange for tax abatements granted for a 10-year period; GM
apparently agreed to certain payments if they abandoned the plant within 5 years. The
article also notes the lawsuit between Ypsilanti, Michigan, and General Motors over GM's
plans to close the Willow Run assembly plant after securing tax relief from the
community.
116. Despite their ambiguity, the standards set out supra text accompanying notes 4153, are superior to the total negation of standards flowing from the consideration of other
constituencies. See William J. Camey, Does Defining ConstituenciesMatter?, 59 U. CIN.
L. REv. 385, 420-24 (1990).
117. See infra text accompanying notes 132-49.
118. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181-82
(Del. 1986).
119. Id.
120. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
121. E.g., PIK Preferred (payment in kind preferred) in which the preferred dividend
may be paid in additional shares of the preferred, at least for the first few years. Most of
these instruments require that cash dividends be paid at some time in the future. Cf.
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 376 n.5.
122. E.g., "poison-pill preferred"-special types of preferred stock issued by potential
target corporations with rights that are designed specifically to make unwanted takeover
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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to be sure. Still, these hybrid or derivative products attain value because of the
protections developed for the underlying securities-essentially common
stock-from which they have been derived.22 Hence, even these innovations
support protections for the holders of the underlying securities.
It is easy to think of institutional investors as sophisticated investors who
can look out for themselves. Of course, many institutional shareholders are the
pension funds of ordinary working-class folks, or the vehicles for individuals
seeking to save for retirement. Although the institutions can afford to, and many
do, employ skilled investment analysts, these investors remain surrogates for
their beneficial owners, and it is these beneficial owners who deserve
protection.124 Institutions could be more active in attempting to influence
management, and some have. 125 The California Public Employees Retirement

attempts difficult or impossible. The unique feature of a poison pill is that it gives
additional rights to shareholders when an aggressor makes a public tender offer for target
shares, or acquires a specified percentage of target shares. The additional rights may be
additional voting rights for shareholders other than the aggressor (a "voting" poison pill),
or additional financial rights in the target (e.g., the right to acquire additional shares or
indebtedness of the target at a bargain price if the pill is activated-a "flip-in" poison
pill), or rights to buy aggressor shares at a bargain price in the event of a back-end merger
between the target and the person whose tender offer originally triggered the poison pill
(a "flip-over" pill). Generally, management can redeem the pill at a nominal price before
the rights become vested; the pill is therefore a negotiating device. In that regard, Mo.
REv. STAT. § 351.459(5) (Supp. 1993), the "Business Combination" section, may have
the effect of a poison pill. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN
BUSINESS § 17.13 (1989).
123. That is, if the underlying common stock cannot pay a dividend, then the SCORE,
see supra note 104 and accompanying text, is worthless, and if the common stock loses
its residual, liquidation value, then the PRIME is worthless. By the same token, PIK
preferred depends on the company remaining viable so that it will someday be able to pay
cash dividends, as promised. Thus, all these instruments depend on the underlying
vitality of the residual claimants, the holders of the common stock.
124. Indeed, the SEC has directed pension fund managers to utilize their proxies for
the benefit of plan participants. Ferrara & Zirlin, supra note 95, at 352 n.43 (citing
Marcia Parker & Marlene Givant, Executives Warned of Proxy Vote Liability, PENSIONS
& INVESTMENT AGE, May 18, 1987, at 1, 58).
125. Ferrara & Zirlin, supranote 95, at 356, note that professional portfolio managers
have tended to oppose poison pill plans. Institutional investors take an active part in
introducing shareholder proposals to eliminate poison pills, opt out of the takeover
protection laws, and limit "golden parachute" arrangements. Id. at 358. See also Pozen,
supra note 108, at 24, noting that Fidelity Investments has designated Fidelity
Management & Research Co. to vote shares held by the various funds managed by
Fidelity Investments at annual meetings of nearly 3,000 companies, following guidelines
established by the independent trustees of Fidelity funds. The author notes that, although
Fidelity funds usually support the positions recommended by management, they will
withhold votes, or vote against, proposals likely to affect their stockholdings negatively,
such as antitakeover devices. See also Michael Quint, Teacher's Pension FundAsks for
Diverse Boards, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1993, at D6 (setting out guidelines issued by
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/2
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System (CalPERS) has been particularly active; for example, it has introduced
shareholder proposals to repeal "poison pills" and has voted against antitakeover
amendments. 26 Not surprisingly, such institutional activism, and particularly
proposals for proxy reform that would make it easier for shareholders to
introduce matters for consideration and to communicate with each other, has
elicited opposition from business groups such as the American Society of
Corporate Secretaries, Inc. and the Business Roundtable. 27 Further, because of
the size of their holdings, institutions can no longer avail themselves of the
"Wall Street walk"--selling their shares and reinvesting in other securities-when they become dissatisfied; their sales would probably have a
pronounced negative impact on the market. We come back, then, to the
importance of the courts' looking to the interests of the shareholders, the longterm investors, in evaluating managers' conduct. Consideration of other
constituencies conflicts with the shareholder's interests.
Further, it may be useful to classify corporations according to numbers of
shareholders, and evaluate the impact of "other constituency" legislation on them
separately. At one extreme, we have the closely held corporation, consisting of
few shareholders, all of whom are acquainted, and all or most of whom have
significant involvement in the corporation on a daily basis, usually in some sort
of management capacity. Such corporations are unlikely to be able to take
advantage of these provisions. Because of their size and greater risk, the
constituencies with which they deal can ask for, and get, personal guarantees by

Teacher's Insurance Annuity Association/College Retirement Equities Fund on how it
would vote the $52 billion of corporate stocks it holds); Michael Quint, Pension Group
Lists 50 Companies as FinancialLaggards, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1993, at D3 (reporting
a list of companies identified by the Council of Institutional Investors as performing
poorly).
126. Ferrara & Zirlin, supra note 95, at 358 n.59 and accompanying text. See also
Karmel, supra note 1, at 83 (recounting CalPERS's request to the SEC for a rulemaking
project that proposed 48 changes in the proxy rules). More recently, United Shareholders
Association has been organized as a Washington advocacy group on behalf of
shareholders; this group subsequently supported the CalPERS petition, and filed its own
request for comprehensive revisions. Id. at 83-84.
In the wake of bad times, even IBM has found it necessary to overhaul its board,
creating a "governance" panel of outside directors-at least, in part, in response to
criticisms from shareholders' groups. See Michael W. Miller, IBM, Overhaulingits
Board,Will Create 'Governance'PanelofOutside Directors,WALL ST. J., July 30, 1993,
at A3.
See also Joan E. Rigdon, Kodak Seeks OutsiderTo Be Chairman, CEO, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 9, 1993, at A3 (reporting that Kodak directors, in a special board meeting called
by the "outside" directors, forced the Chief Executive Officer to step down); Joan E.
Rigdon, More Senior Executives Get Hiredby the Board, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 1993, at
B I; Lilli Gordon, New Dealfor Shareholders,WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1993, at A18; Paul
Ingrassia, BoardReform Replaces the LBO, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1992, at A14.
127. Karmel, supra note 1, at 84-85.
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at least the major shareholders, and those interested in the firm are unlikely to
be able to misappropriate assets belonging to others. Among the shareholders
themselves, because of their closeness and small number, they are able to protect
their own interests contractually. In the event a controlling group forces its will
on a reluctant minority, there is also the possibility of a suit for breach of
fiduciary duties ii la Donahue,28 or an action for judicial dissolution on the
ground of oppression.'29
At the other extreme are the mega-corporations such as IBM, AT&T, and
RJR Nabisco. Here, the "contractarian"'130 view of the shareholder as a "renter
of capital" who, incidentally, assumes some residual risk, is more tenable. In
many cases, it seems doubtful if even the shareholder views himself as an
"owner." Rather, he has "invested" his money in the hope that it will increase
in value. He chose to hold stock rather than a bond because he hopes for a
higher return than a bond will provide, especially in unsettled economic times
when one must always consider the possibility of inflation. Still more remote
as an "owner" of a corporation is the "indirect" shareholder, one who invests in
a mutual fund or a pension or retirement plan that happens to have that particular
stock in its portfolio. Is either group of shareholders, the "direct" or "indirect,"
a more compelling focus for judicial concern than the employees of a plant that
will be shut down, or a customer who will lose a source of supply, or a
bondholder who will find that the risk of her debt is magnified by the additional
indebtedness undertaken to finance a buy-out?
Between these two extreme situations lies a vast middle area, in which there
is, or probably should be, real ground for concern for the individual shareholders' welfare. Consider a corporation with 75 to 125 shareholders, most of whom
are passive investors. Are they not entitled to something more than the
economists' flippant, "If they're adequately diversified, they're protected from
what happens to any one firm?"'' Most of these shareholders have no real basis
to be able to influence management to put their interests first; they are
completely at the mercy of the controlling person or group. And, it's no answer
to say that they shouldn't complain because they should have realized when they
invested in this type of company that they might lack liquidity and be completely
at the mercy of management. When people are getting together to organize a
new business, they tend to be full of optimism and often are blind to potential
pitfalls. People just are not as rational as the efficient market proponents think
they should be. This group of shareholders seems to be the group most likely to
be victimized by legislation like the other constituency statutes.
128. See supra note 97.

129. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.494.2(b) (Supp. 1993). Of course, the new,
optional close corporation sub-chapter, Mo.

REV. STAT

§§ 351.750-.935 (Supp. 1993),

will permit precise tailoring of an electing corporation's governance rules to protect
against such antics, ifcounsel for the organizers thinks of including them.
130. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note I 10 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/2
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Other constituency statutes are ambiguous and so affected with uncertainties as to virtually insure that they will wreak more havoc than they can possibly
cure. A partial list of the problems would certainly include the areas mentioned
below.
Most of the statutes, like Missouri's, are permissive, not mandatory.'32
Therefore, some have contended that the statutes should not be construed as
creating a right of action in any of the enumerated categories. 33 However, only
a few statutes specifically state that they do not create a right of action. 34 We
are then left to wonder what courts in the other jurisdictions will do; only
litigation will determine that. It seems unlikely that, if a member of one of the
nonshareholder constituencies filed suit, a court would dismiss it out of hand.
The ambiguity in the statutes stems, in part, from the lack of guidance as
to how the various factors are to be considered or the weights to be given
them. 3 That is, directors are given no guidance on these matters, and more
importantly, courts have no guidelines by which to review directors' action
purportedly based upon consideration of other constituencies. Professor
Bainbridge 136 contends that this reflects a conscious legislative determination to
leave these issues to the discretion of the board of directors, subject to judicial
review of the self-dealing aspects. But, considering the haste with which many
of these statutes were adopted, 137 it is difficult to believe that the respective
legislatures had any intent, other than to satisfy whatever special interest was
pushing for the legislation. Of course, it would be appropriate to follow
Professor Macey's suggestion 3 8 and construe the statute in a public-regarding
manner, thus transforming statutes designed to benefit special interests
(corporate management) into statutes that in fact serve the public interest.
Clearly some of the factors enumerated in these statutes 139 are factors that
any board operating with due care would have to consider. Often, these factors
would be determinative. That is fine when we are talking about structural
decisions 4 ' but now Missouri's statute (like most of the others) applies to any

132. Contra CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West 1991).

133. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 987.
134. GA. CODE ANN § 14-2-202 (b)(5) (Harrison 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1994); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1717 (Supp. 1993).
135. Cf Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 988.
136. Id. at 989-90.
137. See supra notes 74, 80 and accompanying text; see Romano, supra note 26, at
125-28.
138. Jonathon R. Macey, PromotingPublic-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 267 (1986).
139. E.g., the consideration being offered, or the possibility of illegality.
140. See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 975, in which takeovers are defined as
"structural decisions"--those that relate to changes in the ownership structure of the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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exercise of the board's business judgment, including
"operational" decisions.4
142
Here, the effect of these statutes is less clear.
For example, the statutes provide no guidance as to how a board, or a court,
should accommodate conflicts between different constituencies. Consider a
hypothetical chemical company, ABC Co., operating in Missouri and employing
500 workers in a small town. It is clearly the largest employer in the immediate
area. But, it incurs considerable expense in meeting the requirements of United
States environmental protection laws, and management recognizes that it also
could save a substantial amount in labor costs by moving to the maquiladora
zone in Mexico. The ABC shareholders would thus benefit in two ways by
ABC's shutting down the Missouri plant and moving the operation to Mexico:
Increased profits due to lower labor cost and no environmental protection
expenses. 143 The 500 American employees will be hurt, as will the local
community, by ABC's departure, but presumably 500 workers in Mexico will be
working at good wages, and the Mexican community will "benefit" from another
U.S. plant. The global environment may suffer, but the American environment
will be relieved of an environmental threat, at least directly. Suppose that, on
balance, the board of ABC decides to remain where it is, in order to continue to
support the employees and the community, and to protect the global environment. Would the directors' concern for these other constituencies insulate them
from liability to a shareholder? Even if the statute would protect the directors
here, could a court summarily dismiss a shareholder suit brought against the
directors challenging this decision? Or, conversely, if the ABC board determines to place the interests of shareholders first and move to Mexico, could
members of the community or the employees recover in an action against the
board?' 44 Along the same line, because most of the statutes are permissive, not
mandatory, a board may consider these factors, but need not do so. How is a
board's decision not to consider some constituency to be judged? In the ABC
hypothetical, suppose the board decided that, from the standpoint of employees,

corporation.
141. Id. "Operational decisions" are all those necessary to run the firm on a
continuing basis.
142. Professor Bainbridge argues that the business judgment rule should apply in
operational decisions, and that, in consequence, the other constituency statutes will not
change the legal regime in this area. Id. at 997-1002. As noted in the text, this is far from
certain.
143. Cf WILLIAM S. GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE: THE BETRAYAL OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 391-92 (1992).

144. Of course, one can construct a fairly sophisticated argument to the effect that
the decision to keep the plant in Missouri, although it may depress profits somewhat (at
least in the short term), is in the long-term best interests of the shareholders as well. Even
if a court ultimately accepted this argument, it would justify summary dismissal of a
shareholder's action.
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the move was a "zero sum" game, 145 and therefore it didn't worry about the effect
on employment. How should a court treat that determination?
Although the traditional common law rules do not necessarily provide
greater certainty, at least they limit the number of possible groups that must be
considered, or that may challenge a transaction. Directors remain accountable,
to some degree, to shareholders. They cannot raise the specter of considering
some other group as a defense to a challenge.
To attempt to interpret the statutes in a public-regarding way, as suggested
by Macey, a court might determine that the ostensible goal of the statute was to
ensure that directors consider the effect of their actions on all constituencies. In
fact, the private interest was to protect incumbent managers from displacement
or challenge by disappointed parties. Then, the court might decide that unless
a board could demonstrate that its decision benefitted one of the constituencies
without making any of the others worse off, the directors should be liable in
damages to any of the groups who were adversely affected. That would, it
seems, be to interpret the statute in a public-regarding manner.
Note that even an operational decision does pose conflict of interest, selfdealing, problems.146 Directors, in theory, are elected by shareholders;147 none
of the other constituencies has any input on that decision. Therefore, directors'
self-interest should lead them to favor the interests of shareholders over those of
other constituencies, that is, the directors' decision to favor shareholders may be
tainted by self-interest, the desire to retain their directorships and the perquisites
that go with them. But, ordinarily the business judgment rule does not apply
when the director's action is tainted by self-dealing. How, then, can we invoke
the business judgment rule to insulate directors' consideration, or lack of
consideration, of other constituencies?
If, as was suggested earlier, these statutes are motivated in part by the desire
to protect directors from excessive liability, they do so only indirectly. Why not
do so more directly, as some states have? 148 And, why do some states have both
to limit directors' liability and a nona provision permitting a corporation
149
shareholder constituency statute?

145. E.g., although one group of employees-the Americans-lose out, another
group-those in Mexico-gain, and so society as a whole isn't hurt. (This ignores
differing wage rates, but assuming that each plant meets the prevailing wage level of its
locale for that type of employment, it is difficult to fault the company for that.)
146. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 975-76.
147. Of course, Mace's studies indicated that this is largely a myth, and that directors
are in fact usually selected by management. See MACE, supra note 115.
148. E.g., DEL. CO6E ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1993) (permitting a corporation
to include in its articles of incorporation a clause limiting the directors' exposure for
breach of the duty of care). Although it is an opt-in statute, it does not provide for
periodic renewal of that clause.
149. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313 (d),(e) (West Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN.

§ 23-1-35-1(b), (e) (Bums 1989).
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Moreover, it does not appear that a corporation could "opt out" of the
coverage of the statute. By its terms, the statute applies to all corporations.
There is no "unless the articles otherwise provide," nor must the corporation
adopt a provision in its articles or by-laws to compel directors to consider these
constituencies. Although the "nexus of contracts" school might argue that
shareholders should be able to elect not to be covered by a particular statute, it
is difficult to see a court giving effect to such a clause,' particularly when there
is no tradition of modifying the rules like that and quite a long tradition of
adhering to the-statutorily-specified forms.
Another problem is that the statutes do not appear to reflect any conscious
consideration of the fundamental policy issue: what groups should be
considered in reaching these decisions?' And, if there are perceived dangers
to groups extemal to the corporation who may require protection, is it appropriate, as a matter of public policy, to charge corporate directors, supposedly
selected by the shareholders and therefore not a politically responsible group,
with responsibility for providing that protection? Or, should those. protections
be provided by the state or some other outside body?
Finally, and most importantly, if the statute is given any effect at all, does
it not negate any and all duties owed by directors? That is, could a board of
directors insulate any action it wanted to take from suit simply by claiming, "We
considered the impact on (one or more of the other constituencies, and based our
decision on that?" To be sure, as Bainbridge indicates,' 52 a court would want to
examine the bona fides of the claimed consideration of other constituencies'
interests, but it should not be difficult for reasonably competent corporate
counsel to produce documentation, to reflect such consideration.
VII. WHAT CONSTITUENCIES SHOULD BE PROTECTED?

Some of the problems with other constituency statutes arise from the
concern that no one has thought carefully about which constituencies need
protection. 53 The "laundry list" set out in the statutes sounds good, but
expressly denies that it is exclusive. 54 The problem is bad enough when
consideration of other constituencies is required only in connection with
takeover bids; it is exacerbated when the scope of the statutes is extended to all
exercises of business judgment. Which groups have relationships with the
150. Cf authorities cited supra note 108.
15 1. Cf Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property,40 STAN. L. REV.
611 (1988). See infra text accompanying notes 152-53.
152. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 998 & n.120.
153. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
154. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347.1(4) (Supp. 1993) permits consideration of these
factors, among others: "Social, legal and economic effects on employees, suppliers,

customers and others having similar relationships with the corporation, and the
communities in which the corporation conducts its business ....
"
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corporation similar to those of employees, suppliers, and customers? And, how
are each of these persons affected by the manifold variety of decisions boards
of directors must make? The effects of different sorts of decisions on some of
the groups likely to be impacted need to be considered.
A. Shareholders
The traditional view has been that shareholders are the owners of the
corporation, however their ownership has always been of a very attenuated
variety, at least in all but the closest of corporations. Shareholders' participation
in management is very indirect, through the election and removal of directors
and approval of a limited number of extraordinary transactions, such as mergers,
sales of all or substantially all of the assets, amendment of the articles of
incorporation, or voluntary dissolution.'55 They accept an unspecified claim on
current earnings in the hope of a substantial residual claim on the corporation
upon dissolution.'56 In corporations owned by more than a very few shareholders, it is very difficult for the shareholders as a group to protect themselves
contractually against management self-dealing or perfidy. That is the reason the
concept of management's fiduciary duties arose, to minimize the "agency costs"
of public ownership of firms. 157 The classic view, exemplified by the Dodge
case,158 makes managers' duties run exclusively to the corporation, representing
the shareholders as a group. If other groups sought the protection of fiduciary
duties, courts generally looked to their contract (their indenture) to see what
for themselves; if there were none there, the
protections they had provided
59
creditor was out of luck.'
In considering the impacts of directors' decisions on shareholders, and
others, it is useful to separate routine business decisions"6 from more fundamental transactions.' 6' At one time, 162 fundamental changes required unanimous
shareholder approval. As that proved unworkable, the law relaxed to permit
such changes to be effectuated with majority (often super-majority) approval,
but protected dissenting shareholders by granting them the right to have their

155. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 351.090, .093, .315, .425, .464 (Supp. 1993).
156. KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 91, at 273-74.
157. Id. at 172-73.
158. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Aladdin Hotel Co. v. Bloom, 200 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1953); Elliott
Assoc. v. J. Henry Schroder Bank & Trust Co., 838 F.2d 66 (2nd Cir. 1988). See Dale
B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have More Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate over
Corporate Bondholders' Rights, I COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 53-67, 131-132 (1989)
(arguing against creation of a fiduciary duty towards bondholders).
160. See supra note 146 and accompanying text; Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 975.
161. See supra note 141 and accompanying text; Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 975.
162. HARRY G. HENN &JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 195, at 517 (1983).
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shares repurchased by the corporation at a "fair" price-the so-called "appraisal
163
remedy."'

Most of the discussion of other constituency statutes has focused on the role
of these statutes in the context of takeover bids, generally hostile ones,"6 where
managers may be tempted to resist even a bid that is beneficial to shareholders.
This is the area in which directors' self-interest is most apt to conflict with the
interests of shareholders and other constituencies, but similar concerns exist
even in the context of negotiated transactions: the concern is that directors may
be inclined to approve a merger that gives shareholders less than the best
possible price, in consideration of extra benefits flowing to the directors, such
as consulting contracts, guarantees of employment, or golden parachutes.165
Revlon's holding that, once the decision has been made that the company is for
sale, the role of the board changes to that of auctioneer, seeking the highest price
for the shareholders, does not preclude a board from preferring a negotiated
transaction at a price less than the maximum possible price to shareholders
because of some side benefit flowing to them.66 To be sure, in this context, too,
the appraisal right offers some protection to the shareholders, although it is
imperfect and costly to enforce.
In the case of hostile takeover bids, if a bid is successful, the shareholders
will get a price substantially above that available in the market.16 7 In a sense,

163. E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.405 (Supp. 1993).
164. In that regard, the article by Professor Bainbridge is an exception, although even
he looks most extensively at the takeover context.
165. Bainbridge supra note 3, at 1010. See Barr v. Wackman, 329 N.E.2d 180 (N.Y.
1975) (after the boards of Talcott National Corp. and Gulf & Western had agreed in
principle on G&W's acquisition of Talcott, the Talcott board approved a number of
transactions made for the benefit of Talcott's inside directors and G&W, but not Talcott
or its shareholders).
166. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (1986);
see also Barr,329 N.E.2d at 184, 188; Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1010-11.
167. This was certainly true in the case of the hostile bids in the '80s, in which
premiums of 50% and more above market price were paid to shareholders, and probably
holds even in the area of negotiated mergers. When the merger is financed with highyield bonds, as noted above (see supra note 5), previously outstanding bonds were often
down-graded by the rating services, resulting in a substantial loss of capital value to the
holders of those bonds. This, then, resulted in a transfer of value from the prior
bondholders to the common stockholders. See generally McDaniel, supranote 5, at 20609; HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 408 n.4.
Employees' investment in the firm, as noted previously (supra note 116 and
accompanying text), is primarily in the form of "human capital"-skills they have
developed over the years that are largely specific to the particular firm, and may not be
as useful to other firms. Often, the employee is encouraged to develop these skills in
exchange for wage increases, but often the employee has not been compensated in full
for the higher skill level. In part, the employee has relied on the implicit promise of
certain benefits that may be endangered if the firm is taken over and the employee
discharged, or the pension fund used in part to finance the takeover. In that way, the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/2
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then, shareholders may be arrogating to themselves part of the firm-specific
capital investment of others; mainly employees, but possibly creditors and others
as well' 68 And, even in those cases in which management may be tempted to
recommend a transaction that is at too low a price, a69fully diversified shareholder
is protected against this sort of firm-specific risk.1
When we turn to the area of operational decisions, other constituency
statutes may represent a very fundamental change in corporate doctrine.
Traditionally, shareholders have had little or no direct input on these sorts of
decisions; they are the sorts of matters that are committed to directorial
discretion under the statutory directive that "the property and business of a
corporation shall be controlled and managed by a board of directors."'70 This
gives the board virtually plenary power over the corporation. Under the
conventional formulation of the business judgment rule, when the board in good
faith, and in the absence of fraud, illegality, or self-dealing, exercises its business
judgment, a court will not look behind the judgment and impose liability on the
directors, even if the decision proves to have been erroneous.' 7 ' In exercising
its business judgment, the board is expected to consider the best interests of the
corporation. This presumably includes the best interests of the shareholders, but
does it permit the board to consider the impact on other constituencies? In a
sense, extending the other constituency statutes to all board exercises of business
judgment may suggest a legislative belief that a board could not consider the
effect of a particular course of action on other constituencies.'72 Again, the
permissive nature of the statutory language is troubling: they may consider these
other constituencies, but they don't have to do so. Professor Bainbridge argues
that these statutes do not change the rules in these areas of operational
decisions, but that seems unclear. Professor Bainbridge is correct, however,
in his contention 74 that extra-judicial constraints eventually will limit managers'

shareholders also expropriate some of the employees' human capital when the aggressor
reduces work forces and/or benefits in order to satisfy the indebtedness incurred. See
Coffee, supra note 2, at 11-12; O'Connor, supra note 110, at 905-17.
168. Coffee, supra note 2, at 11-12; Bainbridge supra note 3, at 1007-008. See also

Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205, 206-09 (1988).
169. Coffee, supra note 2, at 19.
170. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.310 (1986). Other statutory formulations vary, but the
effect is the same. See, e.g., MBCA § 35 ("[A]ll corporate powers shall be exercised by

or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed
under the direction of, a board of directors"); RMBCA § 8.01(b) (same).
171. CLARK, supra note 10, at 123, 124.
172. That is, the legislature must not have believed that the board could consider the

impact on other constituencies under common law approaches because if it hadbelieved
such considerations to be already available there would be no need for the statutory
authorization.
173. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1001.
174. Id. at 1000-01.
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ability to serve their own interests in these operational decisions. Once it
becomes clear that particular managers engage in that sort of behavior, either
investors will replace them, or investors will shift their investments from that
firm into firms that are more honestly managed. These same sorts of market
constraints do not operate in the takeover context, however, because those are
"final period problems":1 75 if the transaction occurs, the firm ceases to exist, and
those managers will not have to interact with other groups any longer.
B. Managers

As Coffee'7 6 points out, managers are more vulnerable to loss in the context
of takeovers, because they are less capable of diversifying their investments in
the firm than are shareholders. A large part of managers' investment is firmspecific "human capital"-the particular skills that are required in that firm, but
perhaps not transportable, such as the acceptance of lower current compensation
in reliance on an implicit promise of continued employment and deferred
benefits in retirement. 77 Further, compensation plans using company securities,
stock options, and other incentives increase the concentration of managers'
investments in the particular firm. Thus, when shareholders receive premium
prices in hostile takeovers, it is quite likely that at least part of that premium
represents a transfer of wealth from managers to shareholders. 178 Top managers
have demonstrated their ability to negotiate for protection
from this type of
79
danger through such means as "golden parachutes.'

175. Id. at 1001.
176. Coffee, supra note 2, at 17-19.
177. Thus, there is an "implicit" contract between the manager and the corporation
that is threatened in the takeover context. See id. at 23-24; Van Wezel Stone, supra note
3, at 48-53.
178. Coffee, supra note 2, at 23-24; Van Wezel Stone, supra note 3 at 48-53. This

again is an illustration of the "implicit contract" theory: if the manager is discharged
following a successful takeover bid, he may never receive the implicitly promised

benefits. To that extent, wealth is transferred from the managers to shareholders. Of
course, to the extent that managers own shares in the target corporation, they receive the
same premium as the other shareholders, but it is unlikely to be equivalent to the
"promised" benefits.

179. A "golden parachute" is a contractual undertaking by the company that, in the
event of the occurrence of specified events (e.g., a hostile takeover), the manager will
receive a generous severance payment. In the RJR Nabisco takeover, Ross Johnson, the
former CEO of RJR, received a $50 million golden parachute. See BURROUGH &
HELYAR, supra note I. In some cases, lower level employees have received "tin
parachutes"--similar contracts, at lower severance payment levels-but this practice
appears to be less widely used. See, e.g., Alison Leigh Cowan, New Ploy: "Tin
Parachutes,"N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 19, 1987, at D1. See also Patrick J. Ryan, Corporate
Directors and the "Social Costs" of Takeovers-Reflections on the Tin Parachute,64
TUL. L. REv. 3 (1989).
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But, a hostile takeover bid presents the essential conflict of interest situation
for top management. They know that if a bid is successful, they probably will
be replaced. The "inside directors" have a pronounced conflict of interest, which
"taints" the judgment of the entire board, especially when "inside" directors
constitute a majority of the board. 80 This justifies the most intense judicial
scrutiny of management's actions in response to a takeover bid. And, because
the business judgment rule typically does not apply in the case of self-dealing,' 8'
it is difficult to see how the other constituency statutes could be invoked here.
It appears, though, that the legislatures thought they could apply.
Commentators 82 have argued that hostile tender offers are the market's way of
disciplining inept management, and insuring that assets are put to their highest
and best use, and that therefore management should be passive in response to
tender offers. The difficulty is that many of the takeover targets of the '80s were
well-managed companies; s3 because some of the companies resulting from these

180. Mace, supranote 115, at 43, reported that, in practice, directors were most often
selected by top management, unless there was a significant shareholder group that was
able to gain representation on the board. And, "outside" directors-those whose only
affiliation with the corporation is service as a director-tend to be chosen from the ranks
of high executives of other corporations, people who are very similar in background and
outlook to the very managers they are supposed to be supervising. Further, chief
executive officers are unlikely to ask persons whom they expect to be hostile to their (the
CEO's) positions or actions. Thus, until relatively recently, one would expect the actions
of a board of directors to be strongly influenced by the position of the inside directors.
See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text. Again, outside directors have full-time
commitments to their primary employer, their own corporation; they cannot be expected
to devote extensive amounts of time to their service on a board, and they do not have
access to the detailed information that inside directors possess. See generally CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975); MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND
REALITY (1971); RALPH NADER ET. AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976). Thus,

the conduct of the director defendants in Sinith v. Van Gorkoin may not have been as
unusual as the chancery court suggested.
18 1. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
182. Lucian A. Bebcheck, The Casefor FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers: A
Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23, 28 (1982); Coffee, supra note 2, at 5.
183. See, e.g., Edward S. Herman & Louis Lowenstein, The Efficiency Effects of
Hostile Takeovers, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF HOSTILE
TAKEOVERS 217-220, 230-233 (John C. Coffee et. al., eds., 1988), reprinted in
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 974-79.
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leveraged buy-outs have had to be reorganized again and again"8 4 successor
management may not have been all that disciplined or efficient.
When we turn to operational decisions, managers are making those
decisions now; it is difficult to see how managers as a group are affected.
Presumably, they take their own interests into account in making those
decisions. For them, the other constituency
statutes offer a justification for
85
whatever decision they want to make.
C. OtherEmployees

Ordinary employees may lose jobs when companies are taken over, or when
companies restructure drastically in order to avoid a takeover.'86 However, that
is by no means certain: even when a successful takeover restructures the target
corporation, it does not necessarily mean that the operating elements will be
withdrawn from production. Often, they will merely shift ownership and
continue operations, although they may streamline their employment rosters to
some extent in the process. Furthermore, employees are threatened quite as
much by routine "operational" decisions such as closing a plant in the United
States and moving production into a lower-cost developing country.'87 These
sorts of decisions have traditionally lain within the province of the business
judgment rule.

184. See, e.g., George Anders, Playtex Goes Through Four Buy-outs Since 1985,
Enriching Top Officers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1991, at Al (reporting that Playtex, Inc.
had gone through four buy-outs since 1991); Deals and Misdeals: A Sampling ofM&A
Hits and Strikeouts in the 1980s, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Mar./Apr. 1990, at 100,
102-03 (listing 9 failed LBO's as of that time). More recently, George Anders, More
1980's LBOs Rush To Go Public, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1992, at Cl, reported a number
of former LBO companies that were taking advantage of a "bull" market for new issues
to go public again. Apparently, Playtex is trying to get in on this action, too. See Playtex
FPPlanningIPO To Raise $243.3 Million, WALL ST. J., November 11, 1993, at B6; Ann
Newman Playtex's1PO Will Value the Holdings of CurrentOwners at Over $100 Million,
WALL ST. J., December 2, 1993, at C 11.
185. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.

186. See O'Connor, supranote 110, at 915-17; Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1003-004
nn.136-40.
But see DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND
REORGANIZATIONS 8 (1991), stating that, among 62 targets of hostile takeovers between
1984 and 1986, the total post takeover layoffs were about 26,000 people, or about 2.5%
of the labor force of an average target firm. "These layoffs are noticeable for the target
firm, but small in the context of the national economy. By comparison, General Electric
cut its work force by over 100,000 between 1981 and 1987." Further, the article noted,
post takeover layoffs disproportionately affect relatively high-level white collar
employees, as hostile takeovers lead to reduction of headquarters employment. Id.
187. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text. See also OESTERLE, supra note
187, at 243-59.
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Those employees covered by collective bargaining agreements may be able
to negotiate for job security in the form of plant closing provisions in labor
negotiations. Employees not covered by collective bargaining agreements, and
not sufficiently high in the corporate structure to be able to obtain "golden" or
even "tin" parachutes, may not be able to protect themselves by express
contracts, and the "implicit" contract suggested elsewhere' 88 may be of little
help, or comfort. These employees also have made extensive firm-specific
investments of human capital, in terms of specific skills that are more or less
uniquely suited to a particular firm, which are jeopardized by these sorts of
decisions. Additional dangers lie in adverse changes in retirement plans; these
may be regulated to some degree by ERISA, 89 but the regulation is less than
perfect.9 0
These sorts of matters have traditionally been relegated to the business
judgment rule. The other constituency statute permits the board to consider
these impacts in making its decisions, but provides scant guidance as to how to
weight them, and does not require such consideration. They provide scant
protection for those who most need them. It would be better to protect
employees directly, through plant closing laws and other worker protection
statutes.' 9 '
D. Creditors

As already noted, courts have generally held that directors do not owe
fiduciary duties to creditors.192 Rather, creditors are relegated to whatever
remedies they have provided in their contracts. Long-term creditors have
protected themselves through contractual arrangements, such as requiring
specific levels of reserves, periodic amortization of the debt, requiring specified
levels of shareholders' equity, or accelerating the full amount of the debt upon
a sale of all or substantially all the borrower's assets.' 93

188. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.

189. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (Supp. III 1991). See generally BRUcE ALLAN MILLER,
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (1985).
190. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1003 n.138 (citing examples of the use of

pension funds to finance leveraged buy-outs).
191. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1012 & n.165. Bainbridge cites Marleen A.
O'Connor, Restructuringthe Corporation'sNexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary

Duty to Protect, 60 N.C. L. REv. 1189, 1233 (1991), for the proposition that many of the
managers who vigorously lobbied state legislatures for nonshareholder constituency
statutes were equally vigorous in opposing these worker protection laws.
192. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. See also Tauke, supra note 159, at
53-67, 131-32 (defending the traditional contractual approach to bondholders' rights).

193. Aladdin Hotel Co. v. Bloom, 200 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1953); KLEIN & COFFEE,
BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J. HANKS, LEGAL CAPITAL 103-05

supranote 91, at 240-53;
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In spite of these protections, many long-term creditors were caught off
guard by the leveraged buy-out ["LBO"] phenomenon of the 1980s. Even
though much of the debt issued to accomplish these transactions was subordinated to existing long-term debt, the degree of leverage in many firms became
so high as to materially increase the risk of default on all the debt, thus leading
to a decline in the value of the existing debt. 194 In this way, at least some of the
early LBOs probably did transfer wealth from existing creditors to shareholders.
Toward the latter part of the wave of buy-outs, creditors began to guard against
such transfers by strengthening the protections in their loan agreements,
restricting overall debt levels, and accelerating the debt if leverage exceeded
specified levels.' 95
Ordinary trade creditors may not be able to protect themselves contractually
because they lack the bargaining power to obtain protective provisions. One
selling expendable supplies to a manufacturing concem is very well aware that,
should he seek to include protective provisions in the contract of sale, his
customer will laugh in his face and buy from his competitor, unless his
commodity is somehow unique. Vigilance is the trade creditor's protection:' 96
monitor the debtor closely, and when danger signs appear, act immediately.
Keeping open accounts fairly current is not absolute protection, but should limit
the loss.
So, ordinary trade creditors are one of the prime candidates for protection
by a nonshareholder constituency statute; long-term creditors can protect
themselves generally by appropriate contractual provisions, provided courts will
compel borrowers to honor their contractual commitments. 97 Unfortunately, the
legislatures have not seen fit to provide any guidance for courts as to how to
protect these groups in the wide variety of circumstances under which boards of
directors exercise business judgment, and courts do not seem well equipped to
develop such guidelines on their own. Nor do any specialized agencies seem
better equipped.
E. Suppliers and Customers
Logically, many suppliers will fall into the category of ordinary trade
creditors, which were just considered. Here, however, we are concerned

(3d ed. 1990).

194. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 408-09 n.4 (discussing the downgrading
of RJR Nabisco's pre-existing debt from investment grade ("A") to ' junk" bonds ("Caa")
as a result of the additional debt financing used to complete the merger).
195. See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 409-10 n.6; Coffee, supra note 106, at 1519-20.
196. See, e.g., MANNING & HANKS, supra note 193, at 98-101.
197. Remember, the court did not compel RJR to honor its implicit commitments not
to change the risk to existing creditors by taking on huge amounts of subordinated debt.
See RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. at 1518-25.
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primarily with those suppliers and customers whose claim to protection derives
from their unique ties to a particular corporation. In the case of suppliers, it may
be because they have been induced to make substantial investments that are
suited only to the particular corporation's operations. In a sense, they have a
"firm-specific" investment in the corporation, not too different from that of
employees and managers. 198 Customers may also have unique claims to
protection because of heavy dependence on the corporation's product, making
them vulnerable to the risk of opportunistic behavior by the particular corporation. Once again, these highly vulnerable individuals or firms can seek to
protect themselves contractually, but may lack the bargaining power to succeed.
Other suppliers and customers-those who have other potential customers
or sources of product, and so are not uniquely tied to the particular corporation-are less subject to opportunistic behavior, and thus have lower claims to
protection. Their protection is to take their business elsewhere, provided only
that there are functioning competitive markets to which they can turn.
But, even those firms that are uniquely dependent on a particular corporation inevitably face the risk that the corporation may fail, and they may lose their
customer or their source of supply. Surely, the other constituency statute cannot
reasonably mean that, should a board's exercise of business judgment be
erroneous, so that the corporation fails, these uniquely dependent suppliers and
customers have a claim against directors for not adequately considering the
effect of the transaction on them. Recall the hypothetical situation of ABC
Corp. considering a move of its manufacturing facility to the maquiladorazone
of Mexico, in order to reduce labor and environmental protection costs.' 99 It was
noted above that U.S. workers would be damaged, whereas workers in Mexico
would benefit; the impact on suppliers and customers is less certain. Suppliers
of unique inputs may continue to sell to ABC, albeit at a slightly higher price
because of transportation costs, or the supplier may lose out to other suppliers
closer to the new location. Customers may in fact benefit, because ABC's lower
production costs may permit ABC to sell the product more cheaply, in spite of
higher transportation costs. (Of course, ABC could continue to charge the same
price and reap a fatter profit margin-at least until another producer of ABC's
product emerged to compete.) How is a court to evaluate the directors' decision
to move, or not to move, under these circumstances? Under traditional analyses,
the court would apply the business judgment rule, and exonerate the directors.

198. That is, a corporation has chosen to organize its production across markets, by
contract, rather than organizing within the firm, as by undertaking to manufacturing the
supplies within the firm. If the firm had chosen to organize within the firm, then the
fiduciary obligations of the managers would run, in part, to the "supplier" element within
the firm. Should the decision to organize across markets, contractually, lead to legal
differences in regard to managers' fiduciary obligations? If the answer to the question is
"no," then other constituency statutes should be interpreted to require managers to
consider those constituencies.
199. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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The addition of other constituencies expands the protection of the business
judgment rule, rendering the directors' decision virtually impregnable to
challenge.
Again, the legitimate claim these groups have is for protection against
opportunistic behavior by the corporation. The ambiguous other constituency
statutes, as presently constituted, do not provide a basis to do that.
F. Communities
Here, "communities" is used in a generic sense, to include not just local
cities and towns, but other levels--county, regional, state, or national-which
may have interests affected by corporate action. The claim for protection here
arises because the community (often, the immediate locality, but sometimes a
broader region as well) may have made substantial investments in infrastructure-schools, roads, sewers and other public utilities, not to mention tax
relief-in consideration for getting a major corporate facility to locate or remain
within its boundaries. All of these investments, of course, are jeopardized if that
facility relocates, whether because of a corporate combination or some other
business decision (e.g., ABC moves to Mexico).
Again, a community could bargain for contractual protections before
undertaking such substantial investments, but as a practical matter that has been
unlikely to occur because there was just too much competition for new
industries. 200 Recently, a few states 20' have enacted laws requiring companies
to compensate municipalities for financial inducements if they move out of town
prematurely. In 1991, General Motors entered into a ten year contract with the
town of Arlington, Texas, under which the town can seek to recover all the
abated taxes if GM closed its plant within 5 years. 0 2

200. But see Hayes, supra note 4, at B6, reporting that many communities are
demanding long-term commitments in return for tax abatements, low interest loans, and
other financial inducements. The article goes on to note that states and communities are
going to court also, reporting that New York state's commissioner of economic
development was considering suing General Motors, which had announced plans to close
a plant at North Tarrytown, NY, which would idle 3,400 workers. The town had granted
GM tax abatements when it threatened to close the plant in 1980. The article also
referred to a ruling by a trial judge in Michigan that blocked GM's plans to close a plant
in Ypsilanti, MI. because, the court held, "GM had made an implied promise to stay put
when it accepted Ypsilanti's inducement of $13 million in tax abatements in 1984 and
1988." A similar claim was rejected in an action brought by the town of Norwood, Ohio,
over a plant closing in 1987, however. Alas, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court in the Ypsilanti case. See Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556
(Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
20 1. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1927 (West Supp. 1994); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 122.17 (Anderson 1992).
202. Hayes, supra note 4, at B6.
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To some degree, communities may be protected by corporate inertia. When
a corporation has a substantial investment in a locale, and many of its personnel
have developed attachments to the area, there may be a tendency to remain
unless there is a compelling reason for change. A threatened takeover, or
financial reversals, could provide such compelling reasons.
The major point, however, is that other constituency provisions are, at best,
an indirect effort to provide some protection to these interests. Indeed, they may
be more harmful than helpful, for they may lull community leaders into
complacency, thinking that more protection is afforded than in fact exists. If
these concerns are legitimate, and they seem to be, it is far better to address them
directly, as a few states have begun to do.20 3
VIII. CONTEXTS
As noted above,2 4 the original Missouri provision applied only in the
takeover context; it has subsequently been modified so that, like many of the
other statutes, it applies to any exercise of business judgment. The question then
arises, in what contexts should other constituencies be considered? And, how
does the context affect that consideration?
A. Hostile Takeovers

Certainly, a hostile takeover is drastic, so far as management is concerned,
and for shareholders, who presumably receive a premium price for their shares.
As to other possible constituencies, it is difficult to say, a priori,whether any
particular takeover is good or bad. Even in the extreme case of a "bust-up"
takeover, in which the successful acquirer sells off portions of the acquired
company in order to repay part of the debt used to finance the acquisition, the
assets sold are not necessarily removed from production. Rather, they are often
sold to another group that expects to be able to manage the assets more
efficiently. It is difficult to see how other constituencies, or society in general,
are injured by such an eventuality.
Often, in an effort to reduce costs and to help reduce indebtedness, new
management will reduce the labor force, to the detriment of current employees.20 5 But, should the law compel managers to retain unneeded employees? It
is possible that inefficient prior management had allowed the corporation to get
"fat," either to enhance their own prestige and "perks," or for other reasons.
Again, as noted,2° organized employees can bargain for protections in this area,
although more direct statutory protection, in the form of plant closing legislation,

203. See supra note 202.
204. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.

206. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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is probably more efficient. Mid-level employees, who often are not organized,
may not be able to protect themselves contractually; they are the group most
likely to lose out on firm-specific human capital. Top managers have demonstrated their ability to protect themselves through golden parachutes.
In addition, regardless of what directors do or do not do, many natural
events in the course of a business cycle can compel a corporation to seek to
reduce labor charges by shrinking the employee base. Certainly courts would
not compel directors to retain a bloated staff in periods of financial exigency.
Should hostile takeovers be treated differently?
In the context of a hostile takeover, the bidder must believe the target is
worth more than its current market valuation, and so is willing to pay some
premium in order to acquire control. In the context of directors' responses to
such offers, the central issue often becomes how that premium will be divided
between shareholders and managers, after making due allowance for the
contractual rights of creditors.2 7 If the law introduces the interests of other
constituencies into that calculus, it becomes enormously more complicated,
while offering minimal, if any, offsetting benefits.208 Indeed, whatever change
is introduced is most likely to be pernicious, in that it vastly broadens the
discretion granted management.2
B. FundamentalChanges
One of the traditional areas of shareholder involvement is approval of
fundamental changes: amendment of the articles of incorporation, approval of
business combinations (in any of their myriad forms), and voluntary dissolution.
Most also involve the board of directors, who generally formulate a proposal
which is then referred to the shareholders for approval. 10 In each case, the
shareholders will be involved, in that they must vote; in the business combinations area, a dissenting shareholder can also seek an appraisal of the value of his
207. Coffee, supra note 2, at 9, 66-71.
208. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 116, at 417-19.

209. Id.
210. In this respect, the Missouri statute is somewhat more flexible than many
statutes, in that it permits proposals for many of these transactions to be submitted
directly to shareholders without being filtered through the board. Compare, e.g., Mo.
REV. STAT. § 351.090.2(l) (Supp. 1993) (amendment of articles may be submitted
directly to shareholders) with MBCA § 59 (requiring board to propose amendment and
submit to shareholders). As a practical matter, in a corporation of any size, the
shareholders are usually too diverse a group to be able to organize effectively to bring a
proposal for a fundamental change before a meeting of shareholders, so that the board
will almost always be involved. Of course, if there is a shareholder with a substantial
percentage of the shares (as in the case of a partially successful tender offeror), that
shareholder may have the means and desire to by-pass the board. On the other hand,
often such an influential shareholder may well control the board and be able to get
whatever she wants.
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shares, and payment of that value upon surrender of the shares. If other
constituencies are to be considered, it presumably will occur in the board's
decision to propose the change. No one has yet proposed anything comparable
to the dissenting shareholders' rights for other constituencies.
An amendment to the articles of incorporation represents a basic change in
the relationships between and among the corporation, the state, and the
shareholders (and among the shareholders inter se). If an amendment poses
dangers to other constituencies, as some antitakeover amendments might, the
logical agency to intervene and take corrective action would appear to be the
state, rather than the directors who have been chosen by the shareholders alone.
The state could impose procedural requirements for amendments 2" or could
limit the kinds of amendments that might be tolerated. 2 And, some constituencies can protect themselves contractually, as noted above. 2' 3 Involving these
constituencies directly in the amendment process would represent a very
fundamental shift in our perception of the corporation.
Business combinations-here, friendly, negotiated transactions, because
hostile takeovers have already been addressed-will occur only if both sides
consider the combination advantageous. At least, the managements involved
will have to agree; there are mechanisms (e.g., triangular mergers 14) by which
some of the affected shareholders can be by-passed, but even if their vote can be
avoided, they will retain the dissenters' rights to appraisal. The directors'
fiduciary obligations also provide some protection. Creditors and organized
employees can seek contractual protections, again. But, as to other constituencies-communities, unorganized employees, trade creditors-they may be either
helped or hurt, but it is impossible to determine, in the abstract, which it will be.
Again, trying to include all these groups in the determination of particular
combinations is likely to render the process so rigid as to preclude all combinations.

211. E.g., by requiring approval of affected constituencies.
212. The latter seems highly unlikely; it is difficult to envision the types of
restrictions that might be imposed, and any effort to be exhaustive in enumerating
restrictions would be so cumbersome as to be outright ludicrous.
213. See supra notes 187-204 and accompanying text.
214. To accomplish a triangular merger, the would-be acquiring corporation ("A

Corp") creates a wholly-owned subsidiary, Asub, and places A shares in Asub. It then
proposes to the target corporation ("T Co") that T Co merge into Asub in exchange for

the A Corp shares held by Asub. The end result is that T Co becomes a wholly-owned
subsidiary of A Corp, but the A Corp shareholders never got to vote on the proposal. (Of

course, the T Co shareholders would have to vote.) Caveat: if the number of shares to
be issued by A Corp exceeds by 20% the number previously available for trading, and
A Corp shares are listed for trading on the New York Stock Exchange, Exchange rules
may require that A Corp shareholders be allowed to vote, but most state corporation

statutes do not.
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Finally, voluntary dissolution is an extreme measure, unlikely to be
undertaken except in the most unusual circumstances. There may be situations
in which unscrupulous managers and shareholders can seize such an opportunity
to appropriate assets and values properly belonging to one or more of the other
constituencies, but they are hard to visualize.1 5 Indeed, the statutory procedures
governing the winding up of a corporation's business 2 6 are intended to protect
most external parties. If dissolution is indeed in the best interests of the
corporation, the standard for board action, it is difficult to conceive that a court
would block the action in the interests of one of the other groups. Also, it is
important to recall that dissolution does not necessarily mean that the assets will
be withdrawn from production; often, they will merely change hands, to be
operated by new managers.
IX. LIMIT DIRECTORS' LIABILITIES?
One possible explanation for the adoption of other constituency statutes is
that they are intended to limit directors' exposure to liability, by providing
additional defenses directors can raise. But, while there has been a fair amount
of anecdotal evidence about the difficulties getting and keeping good directors
because of the fear of ruinous liability,2 7 there is little valid empirical evidence
of it.218 If, indeed, premiums for directors' and officers' liability insurance
premiums have increased, 21 9 how much of the increase was due to higher
litigation costs, and how much to anticompetitive practices in the insurance
220
industry?
The litigation costs, both direct and indirect, associated with holding
directors to a minimal standard of behavior do not contribute, directly, 221 to
produce goods and services useful to society: they are a net loss to society,
except insofar as the recipients of fees, are able to live at a higher standard of

215. There are many cases, of course, in which managers or controlling shareholders
have attempted to secure advantages denied to minority shareholders. See, e.g., Donahue
v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975); Ellzey v. FyrPruf, Inc., 376 So.2d 1328 (Miss. 1979). These are situations in which courts are
beginning to find fiduciary duties owed by shareholders to one another, as well as the
duties owed by directors and officers.
216. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.462 -.484 (Supp. 1993).
217. See, e.g., William B. Glaberson & William J. Powell, A Landmark Ruling that
Puts Board Members in Peril,Bus. WK., Mar. 18, 1985, at 57.
218. See, e.g., SODERQUIST & SOMMER, supra note 17, at 206 & nn. 17-19.
219. See supra note 19.
220. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1988), the business of
insurance is not subject to the restrictions of the federal antitrust laws.
221. To be sure, to the extent that such litigation induces directors to manage the
companies better, they do contribute to enhanced production. Such contributions are very
indirect, however, and uncertain in amount. Again, is this game worth the candle?
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living. But, the defensive costs of creating "paper trails" to demonstrate a proper
level of directorial behavior are totally unproductive, along with the judicial time
and resources consumed by these cases, which are necessarily "big" cases; if the
plaintiffs can get past the routine motions to dismiss, they can go on for years.
And, of course, the plaintiffs' costs, such as attorney's fees and discovery
expenses, are not insubstantial. But, all these costs would be justified if the
litigation did indeed lead directors-both those sued, and others who learn of the
litigation-to behave with more circumspection in the future. Alas, it seems far
more likely that directors are prompted to beseech their state legislatures for
statutes limiting the amount for which they can be held liable,222 all the while
erecting facades to demonstrate how diligently they've performed. The other
constituency statutes, by expressly countenancing directors' considerations of a
host of other factors in the exercise of their business judgment, probably ease the
directors' minds, whether or not they have any effect.
A. Purposesfor Imposing Liability
Once again, neither courts, legislatures, nor commentators have clearly
stated a rationale for imposing liability on directors. 223 The usual reason for a
damage award is to compensate the parties injured by someone's breach of a
222. Thirty-six states have enacted statutes which limit or authorize corporations to

limit liability of directors. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.050(a) (Supp. 1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 10-054.9 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1005.18 (1990); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 4-27-202 (Michie 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101.5(2)(a) (1986); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 33-290(c)(2) (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)
(1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(4) (Harrison 1990); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 415-48.5(a) (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-54(2) (Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE
§ 490.832 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8) (Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 271B.2-020(2)(b), (5)(d) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:24(C)(4) (West Supp. 1994); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2 (1993);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 13(b)(1 1/2) (West 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 450.1209(c) (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 300.64 Subd. 4 (West Supp. 1994);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-2.02.(b)(4) (Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-216(2)(d)
(1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.037.1 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292:2.V-a.(a)
(Supp. 1993); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-7-28 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney Supp. 1994);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50.5 (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1006.B.6
(West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047(2)(d) (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-48(6)
(1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-2-102 (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 47-2-58.8 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-102(b)(3) (Supp. 1993); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 1302-7.06(3)(B) (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODEANN. § 16-1Oa-841(1)
(Supp. 1993); VA. CODEANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Michie 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.0828
(West 1992); Wyo. STAT. § 17-16-834(a) (1989).
223. Elkind v. Ligget & Myers, 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980), a securities law case,
comes as close as any to identifying a rationale for damage calculations under Rule lOb5; unfortunately, there isn't a counterpart to Elkind in the state law area.
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duty.224 But, considering the massive damages imposed in recent cases, 225 even
a very wealthy board of directors would be unable to satisfy them. Insurance is
the only feasible vehicle for generating such sums. 226 Even these massive
recoveries would result in recoveries of a few cents or a dollar or so per share to
the shareholders of large corporations-slight incentive to bring the action,
which would be further reduced by allowing other constituencies to share in the
recovery.
Another rationale for imposing liability on directors is to induce a desired
minimum level of performance. Although this explanation is more appealing
than that just discussed, it does not seem to require imposition of massive,
ruinous damages. This goal could be reached, even for affluent directors, by
imposing a significant, but not disastrous, amount for which directors could be
held personally liable.227 One objection to this approach is that it may lead the
director into a perverse cost-benefit analysis: if I goof off as a director, and get
caught (and, what is the probability of getting caught?), I can be liable for up to
$X; is my freedom to goof off worth that much to me? 228 And, perhaps more
realistically, if the limit is set too low, it may remove any incentive for the
shareholders, as "private attorneys general," to bring actions against miscreant
directors.
All states permit corporations to indemnify directors against liabilities to
which they are exposed because of serving on a board of directors.2 Permitting
corporations to indemnify directors, or purchase D&O insurance policies for
them, may reduce directors' incentives to perform at acceptable levels of
behavior.230 One approach might be to set some lower limit to the amount that

224. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 210 & n.17, 216-20 (2d ed. 1993).
225. E.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985) ($23.5 million). See supra
notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
226. Of course, as noted supra note 17, insurance orily paid part of the settlement in
Smith v. Van Gorkom.

227. Indeed, many would argue that it is the possibility of being sued, even more than
the exposure to damages, that bears on the sorts of people invited to serve on boards of
directors. They view themselves as community leaders, and worry that being a named
defendant is a blot on their reputations, even if they are ultimately exonerated.
228. Admittedly, this is a far-fetched hypothetical; it is doubtful that the sorts of
people serving on boards of directors would be inclined to engage in this sort of calculus.
Still, the possibility exists.
229. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1991); Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.355
(1986); MBCA § 5.
230. Cf Item 510 of SEC Regulation S-K, requiring that a prospectus for a securities
offering include a description of any indemnification provisions relating to directors,
officers, and controlling persons of the registrant, and requiring that the following

statement be included:
Insofar as indemnification for liabilities arising under the Securities Act
of 1933 may be permitted to directors, officers or persons controlling the
registrant pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the registrant has been
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may be indemnified-e.g., no indemnification for liabilities up to, say,
$500,00023'-but insurance can be carried for liabilities exceeding that amount.
B. What sorts of liabilities?
The principal obligations imposed on directors are a duty of care and a duty
of loyalty. Most of the statutes permitting corporations to limit directors'
liability permit limitations on liability for breach of the duty of care, but not for
loyalty. 232 That division is probably appropriate, if corporations should be
permitted to impose such limits at all.
Directors are required to act with the degree of care of a reasonable person
in a like position under similar circumstances because of the need for them to
exercise some minimal degree of care. At the same time, directors should feel
free to take risks without undue fear of personal liability, because the shareholders, as the residual claimants, benefit the most from those risky ventures that pay
offY3 Professor Coffee234 points out that there is a tendency for shareholders to
be more risk-tolerant than managers, in part because managers' investment is
more firm-specific; properly diversified investors are more willing to accept
risks than are managers, whose human and financial capital may be wiped out
if the risk does not pan out. As a result, a variety of compensation mechanisms
have been devised to attempt to align managers' risk preferences more closely
to those of shareholders.235 Clearly, liability rules that are too strict undercut the
effort to bring managers' risk preferences in line with those of shareholders.
Perhaps the approach taken in Francisv. United Jersey Bank236 is an appropriate
standard: require directors to keep themselves informed, oversee managers
informed that in the opinion of the Securities and Exchange Commission such
indemnification is against public policy as expressed in the Act and is
therefore unenforceable.
17 C.F.R. § 229.510 (1993).
This Item reflects the SEC's historic antipathy for indemnification provisions, based
on their concern that it will decrease the directors' incentive to ensure accuracy of
statements made in a registration statement. The SEC also, as a condition to "acceleration" of the effective date of the registration statement, a practical necessity in almost all
public offerings, requires the issuer of the securities to enter into an undertaking, if there
should be a claim for indemnification, to submit the question to a court of competent
jurisdiction.
231. The number is, of course, arbitrary; it sounds like a lot to some, but probably not
to Ross Perot. Perhaps a sliding scale, in relation to the individual's net worth, could be
used. In any case, the minimum amount should be sufficient to get the director's
attention, but not be ruinous.
232. E.g., DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991).
233. See generally KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 91, at 255-70.
234. Coffee, supra note 2, at 17-19.
235. Id. at 23-24; CLARK, supra note 10, § 6.2.1, at 201.
236. 392 A.2d 1233 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978), ajfd, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981):
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closely, and challenge transactions that appear questionable. Failure to meet that
standard should be punishable, but at a reasonable level.237
The duty of loyalty usually refers to conflict of interest situations.238 As
such, it is not appropriate to limit a director's liability for self-dealing, usurpation
of corporate opportunities, or other breaches of the duty of loyalty. Indeed,
those statutes that permit limitations on liability expressly exclude breaches of
the duty of loyalty. 239 Also, most of the existing indemnification statutes also
bar or limit indemnification in these types of situations.24
C. How to limit?
A statutory limitation on directors' liability would be too inflexible to cover
the myriad situations arising in corporate America. A figure that would deter an
average individual might not dent the consciousness of a very wealthy person.
Also, any formula approach runs the risk of attaining complexity akin to the
Internal Revenue Code. Further, the contractarians 241 would argue that, in a
particular corporation, the shareholders might be willing to impose a limit on
director's liability in order to secure the services of particular individuals, or for
other reasons. Perhaps an individual would be willing to serve for less, or no,
compensation if she were allowed to engage in self-dealing; if shareholders are
willing to accept this, perhaps they should be free to do so. Thus, the Delaware
approach, of permitting a corporation to adopt a provision in its articles of
incorporation imposing such a limit might be acceptable.
One risk inherent in this suggestion is that a Machiavellian promoter might
organize a corporation, and include a limitation provision in the initial articles
of incorporation, in order to avoid later having to submit an amendment adopting
a limit to a shareholder vote. That could be overcome by requiring, in the state
corporation act, that these sorts of limitation provisions be re-adopted periodically by shareholders, perhaps every five years or so.
X. CONCLUSIONS

Given that other constituency statutes are so riddled with uncertainty as to
be of little practical effect, why has there been so much pressure to adopt them?
Surely the lawyers who drafted them are far too intelligent to believe they would

237. Id. at 1242. To be sure, in Francis,full liability was imposed on the director's
estate, without limitation, but the likely beneficiaries of that estate were the director's

sons, who were the primary miscreants in a plan of fraud on business relations.
238. CLARK, supra note 10, § 4.1, at 141; KLEIN &COFFEE, supra note 91, at 163-69.
239. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991).
240. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
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in fact insulate their director clients from liability. 242 Indeed, all they could
realistically have hoped for is an additional argument that directors could raise,
if they were sued over some exercise of business judgment. In this area, as in
many others,243 it is in defendants' interests to delay, and disputes over effects on
other constituencies can certainly extend litigation, even if they do not persuade
a court to dismiss an action on preliminary motion.244 The statutes thus have the
potential to erect additional barriers to shareholders' ability to hold directors
accountable for what they do or do not do.245
If the concern for excessive liability being imposed on directors is
legitimate, the other constituency statutes are, at best, an imperfect, indirect
reaction. It would be much better to provide limitations on liability directly,
through legislation targeted at those areas in which limitations may be
appropriate. Rather than adopt statutory limitations, applicable to all corporations, it would seem better to permit corporations to elect to adopt limits on their
own directors' liability, and such limitations should be subject to shareholder
approval. Ideally, they should be subject to periodic reapproval, perhaps every

242. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1002 n. 133 (saying that this was almost certainly
the intent of the drafters, but at least some of the legislators had real concern for
nonshareholder constituencies). Bainbridge cites back to his footnote 115, at 996, in
which he quotes exchanges with some of the proponents of the Pennsylvania version, and
cites to Charles J. Dangelo, Comment, Community Effects as a Factor in Corporate
Decisions Under Pennsflvania'sNew Business CorporationLaw: Objective Evidence
of a Subjective Process, 28 DuQ. L. REV. 533, 536 (1990), for the notion that the
legislation was intended to benefit shareholders as well as other constituencies, not to
protect corporate management. At best, this reflects the thinking of those particular
legislators; it says nothing at all about what the collective intent of the legislature as a
whole may have been. Indeed, particularly in the area of state legislation, the term
"legislative intent" is an oxymoron.
243. For example, in the antitrust field, it has been noted that, notwithstanding the
possibility of treble damages, it could be financially worthwhile to fix prices even if one
were caught. The use of the extra profits derived from the price fixing throughout the
duration of the litigation, coupled with the courts' typical aversion to allowing interest to
run on damages until the judgment has been entered, means that the defendant in fact
profits, even if he later does have to pay treble damages. See Walter B. Erickson, The
Profitabilityof Violatingthe Antitrust Laws: Dissolutionand Treble Damagesin Private
Antitrust Litigation, 5 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 101 (1972).
244. As the law governing shareholder derivative actions is evolving, with the rise of
special litigation committees and the developments in the demand requirement (see FED.
R. Civ. P. 23.1, which has been the model for many state counterparts)-especially in
Delaware and New York (compare Barr v. Wackman, 329 N.E.2d 180 (N.Y. 1975) with
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984))-the deck is fairly well stacked in
directors' favor without more.
245. Again, the growing strength of advocacy organizations like United Shareholders
Association, coupled with the increased activism of at least some institutional investors,
is tending to counteract this trend to some extent. See supra notes 125-27 and
accompanying text. However, this activity may be too little, too late.
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five years. If the opposite approach, of specifying a statutory limitation, is
chosen, then shareholders should be able to "opt out" of the limits, although in
view of the difficulty in organizing a diverse, disparate, scattered group of
shareholders, that is far less desirable than using an "opt in" approach, with
periodic reapproval.
Concurrently, it would be desirable to spell out standards of director
behavior, rather along the lines of the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act, 246 rather than leave these standards to the current case-by-case determination. The judicial approach might be satisfactory in a jurisdiction, like Delaware
or New York, with a well developed body of case law, but in jurisdictions like
Missouri with limited judicial interpretations, there is too much uncertainty. It
becomes extremely difficult to advise clients with a high degree of confidence
as to how to conduct themselves, and how to ensure that they will be protected
against liability.
Of course, it is fruitless for ajurisdiction that wants to protect shareholders
from managerial overreaching to have rules, either statutory or judicial, that are
much more stringent than those of the most liberal jurisdiction. Under current
interpretations, managers will simply incorporate in the more liberal jurisdiction,
and do business in their "home" state as foreign corporations.247 Additionally,

corporate lobbyists are heard much more clearly in state capitals than in
Washington; legislators anxious to attract industry to the state, in order to help
fill the treasury's coffers, are unlikely to be too hard on corporations, lest they
discourage someone from locating in the state, or lead a domestic corporation
to flee to more friendly climes. It is the "race to the bottom" all over.248 This
again raises an argument for federal incorporation, at249
least of larger corporations,
but that idea has already been rejected many times.
Other constituency statutes are so filled with uncertainties and inconsistencies that they should be repealed. Alternatively, courts should recognize that
the total elimination of any accountability of managers so conflicts with
traditional notions of corporate governance that they should be voided. This
could be done if courts would apply Professor Macey's analysis, and interpret the

246. E.g., RMBCA § 8.30.
247. E.g., most of the large, publicly held corporations headquartered in
Missouri-Anheuser-Busch, McDonnell-Douglas, and Monsanto-are incorporated
elsewhere. The holding company controlling Anheuser-Busch is a Delaware corporation,
although there is a domestic Anheuser-Busch Company; McDonnell-Douglas is a
Maryland corporation; Monsanto is a Delaware corporation. See the PH-MOCORP
database on Westlaw.
248. See the historical sketch in KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 91, at 114-19. Under
Commerce Clause interpretations, it is the law of the state of incorporation that
determines the corporation's internal operations. Id. at 116 n.7.
249. But see Karmel, supra note 1, at 91-96. However, it must be acknowledged
that Congressional personnel may not be immune from the blandishments of lobbyists
either.
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But, for the reasons mentioned in the
statutes in a public-regarding manner.
paragraph just above, neither eventuality is likely to occur anytime soon.
Perhaps the best hope is that the newly-active institutional shareholders and
shareholders' advocacy groups can bring sufficient pressure to bear on managers
to get a significant proportion of corporations to "opt out" of these sorts of
statutes.2

250. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
25 1. See Minow, supra note 26, at 220, in which the author notes that, by October
17, 1990-within months of the passage of the restrictive 1990 amendments to the
Pennsylvania other constituency statute-nearly a third of Pennsylvania's publicly traded
companies had opted out of at least portions of the statute. The author goes on to say that
61% of the Fortune 500 companies incorporated in Pennsylvania had opted out, as had
over 56% of those included in the Standard & Poor 500.
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